HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC:
IN AUSTRALIA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategy

by

MATTHEW JOHN KERBER PATCHING, MAJOR, AUSTRALIAN ARMY
M. Mgt. Studs., University of New South Wales, Australia, 2008.
Grad. Dip. Log. Mgt., Australian Army Accredited Training, 2007.
B. E., University of New South Wales, Australia, 2003.

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2011-02

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)*	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED *(From - To)*
16-12-2011	Master's Thesis	FEB 2011 – DEC 2011

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Human Security in the Asia-Pacific: In Australia's National Interests?	5b. GRANT NUMBER
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S)	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
Major Matthew John Kerber Patching	5e. TASK NUMBER
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301	

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT
Threats to security within the Asia-Pacific region continue to evolve. Traditional and non-traditional threats to state sovereignty and individuals exist across the region. Despite most recent security challenges being transnational, the dominant security policy within the Asia-Pacific region remains state-centric. This policy approach potentially generates instability by undervaluing the importance of individual security. The United Nations (UN) advocates human security as a means of providing freedom from want and freedom from fear for individuals. However, despite the altruistic motives of the UN, neatly separating traditional and human security is unrealistic, as sovereignty remains the foundation of the international system. Therefore, a human security policy approach must include the state-centric means available through instruments of national power.

This research investigates whether application of such a human security policy approach is in Australia's national security interests. The research identifies that Australia's enduring national security objectives and interests are well defined and pursued using a state-centric policy approach. By analyzing case studies addressing threats in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Southwest Pacific, the research concludes that a human security policy approach is in Australia's national security interests.
.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Human Security; Traditional Security; Asia-Pacific region Security; Australian Security Policy.

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	**b. ABSTRACT**	**c. THIS PAGE**			19b. PHONE NUMBER *(include area code)*
(U)	(U)	(U)	(U)	100	

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Matthew John Kerber Patching

Thesis Title: Human Security in the Asia-Pacific: In Australia's National Interests?

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Phillip G. Pattee, Ph.D.

_____, Member
Richard T. Anderson, M.S.

_____, Member
Dirk D. Ringgenberg, M.M.A.S.

Accepted this 16th day of December 2011 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC: IN AUSTRALIA'S NATIONAL
INTERESTS? by Matthew John Kerber Patching, 100 pages.

Threats to security within the Asia-Pacific region continue to evolve. Traditional and
non-traditional threats to state sovereignty and individuals exist across the region. Despite
most recent security challenges being transnational, the dominant security policy within
the Asia-Pacific region remains state-centric. This policy approach potentially generates
instability by undervaluing the importance of individual security. The United Nations
(UN) advocates human security as a means of providing freedom from want and freedom
from fear for individuals. However, despite the altruistic motives of the UN, neatly
separating traditional and human security is unrealistic, as sovereignty remains the
foundation of the international system. Therefore, a human security policy approach must
include the state-centric means available through instruments of national power.

This research investigates whether application of such a human security policy approach
is in Australia's national security interests. The research identifies that Australia's
enduring national security objectives and interests are well defined and pursued using a
state-centric policy approach. By analyzing case studies addressing threats in Northeast
Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Southwest Pacific, the research concludes that a human
security policy approach is in Australia's national security interests.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACRONYMS

ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CHS	Commission on Human Security
D.P.R.K.	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
PIF	Pacific Islands Forum
R.O.K.	Republic of Korea
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
U.S.	United States of America

TABLES

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The global and regional order is now changing so rapidly that we must continue to reassess our evolving national security needs. We need periodically to adjust the lens through which we view the challenges to our security and the arrangements we establish to protect and advance our interests.
— Kevin Rudd, *2008 National Security Statement to the Parliament*

Background

Since the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the concept of human security has gained considerable traction with scholars in the Asia-Pacific region. Other local, regional, and global events including the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, 2005 Bali bombings, and 2004 Asian Tsunami, have increased debate on the relevance of human security policy. These events also raised questions over the links between human and traditional security considerations. Traditionally, the principal referent of security policy has been the state. Traditional security policy is concerned primarily with external aggression and its objective to protect national interests. Human security, by contrast, is the protection of individuals.[1]

There are three ways to address human security.[2] In the first way, human security concerns the basic individual rights of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."[3] In particular, the first way concentrates on the protection and promotion of these rights by the international community through the rule of law. In the second way, the purpose of human security is essentially humanitarian. Viewed through this prism, human security provides the foundation for humanitarian intervention by considering violent conflict, genocide, war crimes and actions that are especially harmful to civilians and non-

1

combatants. The narrow approach groups the first two ways, as they each aim to protect individuals by establishing "freedom from fear."[4] The third way stands apart from the first two by considering a much broader range of threats to individual well-being. Economic uncertainty, social factors, the environment, poverty, disease, and other issues affecting the overall livelihood of individuals are variables in this approach. The third way is a broad approach that addresses "freedom from want," and has many critics due to its inability to set clear, effective priorities.[5] Viewed from the broadest perspective, human security becomes daunting to policy makers.

Despite the challenge, neatly separating the two approaches is unrealistic. Since both want and fear cause violence, states that are either unwilling or unable to cope with the violence, or satisfy the minimum needs of the people, face uncomfortable problems. Indeed, state viability is, in large part, measurable by the ability to manage violence or threats of violence successfully. Further complicating this problem are state activities and economic policies that have exacerbated conflict and further prejudiced security.[6] Frustration generated in the political and social realm is a significant contributor to local, national, and international volatility. Therefore, human security provides an additional dimension to national security by presenting a people-centric approach to resolving problems related to violent internal conflict.

<u>Balancing security in the Asia-Pacific region</u>

Isolating human security without due consideration to enduring traditional security concerns is unrealistic. Addressing human security in local areas supports state security by reducing internal violence and providing freedom from fear and want. For human security to be a legitimate policy approach within the Asia-Pacific region, it must

also cross national borders and boundaries—a multilateral approach to security. In Southeast Asia, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) way of non-interference makes implementation of multilateral trans-border policy difficult. However, ASEAN has recently shown willingness to act on transnational issues where there is a specific regional benefit. For example, despite the non-interference principle, ASEAN's approach to Myanmar has evolved, especially since 1997.[7] In that time, ASEAN members have openly discussed the unjust limitations placed on Myanmar's opposition leaders and urged the ruling military junta to implement full democracy. Members have also had the Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus of ASEAN push the main association to bring Myanmar before the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Most significantly, member states placed considerable pressure on ASEAN to stop Myanmar accepting chairmanship of the organization in 2006, a move that was ultimately successful.

The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States (U.S.), 2002-03 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome pandemic, and the 2004 Boxing Day Indian Ocean Tsunami are the four major challenges to Southeast Asia in recent years.[8] These transnational events initiated the evolution from state-centric to people-centric security. In particular, the Asian Financial Crisis was "the biggest setback for poverty reduction in East Asia for decades."[9] The ensuing financial devastation for many nations generated considerable humanitarian burden and changed the political landscape of the region.

Both terrorism and Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome generated fear within the community—one through fear of violence and the other fear of illness. Finally, the Asian Tsunami generated almost unimaginable humanitarian concern. Since these challenges,

local, bilateral, and multilateral approaches have started to address the security of the people. In particular, Indonesia and Malaysia have worked together to establish response mechanisms to future humanitarian challenges and the Asia-Pacific region Economic Cooperation group has taken considerable action to ensure the economic certainty of the region through their stated priorities.[10] Further, Thailand has commenced generating political solutions to the violence created by injustice at the hands of state officials and the weakness in the judicial process in that country's south.[11]

In the Southwest Pacific, unstable governments have formed the basis of most recent traditional security concerns. The 2003 international intervention in Solomon Islands aimed to restore stability in the archipelago and addressed freedom from fear amongst the Solomon Islands' population. Additionally, the 2006 Fijian military coup generated fear within the local community and prompted international military forces to station off the Fijian coast to evacuate foreign nationals.

While these two examples are predominantly state-centric, threats to security in the Southwest Pacific also cross territorial boundaries. The most pronounced of these challenges are the twin effects of under-development and climate change. A worst-case scenario for climate change forecasts that several sovereign nations in the region will become uninhabitable within the next century. Even for those countries that remain inhabitable, loss of access to fresh water and arable land present first-order human security and second-order traditional security concerns. When coupled with delayed development in many of these post-colonial nations, threats to both sovereignty and the security of the people are prevalent within the South Pacific.

Combining a human security policy approach with existing traditional methodologies provides a better balance and enables nations to treat the conditions that generate internal unrest. In a globalized society, these conditions no longer respect state borders. This being so, transnational security policy is essential to addressing threats to stability and security within the Asia-Pacific region. While there are several bilateral and multilateral agreements in place within the region, no one organization has responsibility for the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. Additionally, inertia generated by the principle of non-interference in Southeast Asia stifles multilateral action within the region. The problem is that security policy in the Asia-Pacific region is predominantly state-centric and fails to adequately consider the effects of fear and want amongst the people.

Australia in the Asia-Pacific region

After defending Australia from direct attack, Australia's secondary strategic interest is the security, stability and cohesion of the immediate neighborhood including Indonesia, Timor Leste, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand and the South Pacific states.[12] To this end, Australia has committed heavily to regional initiatives since 1999. Examples include the 1999 and 2006 interventions in Timor Leste, and 2003 intervention in Solomon Islands, both of which are enduring. Australia has also committed to disaster relief in the local region, with a large interagency contingent supporting the Asian Tsunami relief effort in 2004, and several joint task forces supporting smaller crises in Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Tonga, and the 2010-2011 earthquakes in Christchurch, New Zealand.

Further, stability of the broader Asia-Pacific region and security of Southeast Asia are also of great importance.[13] Despite maintaining economic influence and close

economic ties within Southeast Asia, Australia is not a member of ASEAN, the most credible multinational organization in the region. This exclusion limits Australia's overall influence and leaves it without a direct voice in the area controlling the northern approaches to the Australian continent. In Northeast Asia, Australia enjoys close economic and security ties with Japan and the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.). Additionally, Australia and China have a strong trading relationship based largely on the export of Australian natural resources. However, despite these strong bilateral connections, Australia lacks direct influence in Northeast Asia and is therefore challenged in efforts to ensure broader regional stability.

Research question

The primary research question of this study is: Is a human security policy approach for the Asia-Pacific region in Australia's national security interests? In answering the primary research question, this study addresses several secondary research questions. Firstly, to set the foundation for further analysis, research will determine what are Australia's national security interests and how do they relate to the Asia-Pacific region? Secondly, the study will pursue the question: what are the dominant national security approaches in the Asia-Pacific region? Thirdly, the study asks: what are the current and likely threats? The study then applies this to the concept of human security by asking: would a human security policy approach counter these threats?

Thesis

The thesis put forward by this study is that pursuing a human security policy approach in the Asia-Pacific region is in Australia's national interests.

<u>Assumptions</u>

This study assumes that Australia clearly defines its national security interests in published government documents. Further, the study assumes that national security interests throughout the Asia-Pacific region will remain enduring for the duration of the research. Finally, this study assumes that nationally identified threats to security in the Asia-Pacific region will not change during the conduct of this research.

<u>Definition of terms</u>

This study requires definition of several terms to ensure all readers have a common understanding. These terms are (1) human security, (2) traditional security, (3) human security policy approach, (4) non-traditional security, (5) Asia-Pacific region, and (6) instruments of national power. For the purpose of this study, the term human security means a security framework in which the principal referent is the individual. Human security seeks to free individuals from fear and want, as opposed to traditional security, where the principal referent is the state. Traditional security seeks to ensure the survival of the nation state.[14] As human and traditional security approaches cannot be neatly separated, for the purposes of this study, human security policy refers to human security ends supported by state-centric means.[15] Non-traditional security crosses the boundary between human and traditional security by including threats such as terrorism, natural disasters, climate change, transnational maritime crime, and illegal weapons transit. Non-traditional security threats also include those generated by poor social development.

The study defines the Asia-Pacific region as all countries that are members of ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). In addition, China, Japan, the R.O.K., Fiji, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.), and Timor Leste, are also

included due to their geographic location. Foreign protectorates including American Samoa, Guam, and New Caledonia, while located in the region, are excluded from this study's definition of the Asia-Pacific region. A complete list of countries included in the definition of the Asia-Pacific region is included in table 1.

Table 1. Nations of the Asia-Pacific region		
ASEAN	**Pacific Islands Forum**	**Additional Members**
Brunei Darussalam	Australia	China
Cambodia	Cook Islands	D.P.R.K.
Indonesia	Kiribati	Fiji
Laos	Marshall Islands	Japan
Malaysia	Federated States of Micronesia	R.O.K.
Myanmar	Nauru	Timor Leste
Singapore	New Zealand	
Thailand	Niue	
Vietnam	Palau	
	Papua New Guinea	
	Samoa	
	Solomon Islands	
	Tonga	
	Tuvalu	
	Vanuatu	

Source: Created by author using data from Association of South East Asian Nations, "Member Countries," http://www.aseansec.org/74.htm (accessed 20 April 2011); Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, "Member Countries," http://www.forumsec.org.fj/ (accessed 20 April 2011).

This study uses the instruments of national power as state-centric means for execution of security policy. As Australian doctrine does not clearly define instruments of national power, this research uses the U.S. military definition. In accordance with U.S.

military doctrine, the instruments of national power are diplomatic, informational, military, and economic.[16]

Significance of the study

Australia has been a very secure country for many years due to its geographic location and the strategic primacy of a key ally—the U.S. In recent years, strong economic growth in some Asian economies and the Global Financial Crisis' impact on Western nations have contributed to a shift in global strategic strength. Exacerbating the impact of this shift are challenges to freedom of navigation and risks associated with climate change, especially in the Asia-Pacific region where forecasts range from inconvenience to catastrophe. Further, sustained tension on the Korean Peninsula, the enduring Global War on Terror in the Philippines, and the continuation of military rule in Fiji, all present risks to both human and state security in the Asia-Pacific region. A significant change to the regional security balance will have a direct impact on Australia.

Scope and Delimitations

This study concentrates on the feasibility of implementing a human security policy in the Asia-Pacific region, with a particular focus on the benefits of this approach to Australia's national security interests. The research presents challenges to security within the Asia-Pacific region. To give context, research focuses on case studies from Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Southwest Pacific. The thesis provides recommendations for the consideration of Asia-Pacific region and Australian policy makers.

The study has five chapters. The first chapter outlines the background to the problem and sets the scope for research. A review of relevant literature is in chapter 2. The third chapter defines the research methodology, prior to a systematic analysis of the case studies in chapter 4. The final chapter presents conclusions, recommendations, and suggested topics for further research. This study is at the unclassified level and does not disclose any information prohibited for public release.

---

[1]United Nations, "Human Security Report 2005," http://www.humansecurity report.info (accessed 6 March 2011).

[2]Fen Osler Hampson, "Human Security," in *Security Studies: An Introduction*, ed. Paul D. Williams (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009): 229-43.

[3]Thomas Jefferson, "Declaration of Independence," http://www.usconstitution. net/declar.html (accessed 20 April 2011).

[4]Nicholas Thomas and William T. Tow, "'The Utility of Human Security': Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention," *Security Dialogue* 33, no. 2 (June 2002): 178.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Anthony Burke, "Caught between National and Human Security: Knowledge and Power in Post-Crisis Asia," *Pacifica Review* 13, no. 3 (2001): 215.

[7]See, for example, Jörn Dosch, "ASEAN's Reluctant Liberal Turn and the Thorny Road to Democracy Promotion," *The Pacific Review* 21, no. 4 (2008): 527; Stephen McCarthy, "Burma and ASEAN; Estranged Bedfellows," *Asian Survey* 48, no. 6 (November 2008): 911.

[8]Yukiko Nishikawa, "Human Security in Southeast Asia: Viable Solution Or Empty Slogan?" *Security Dialogue* 40, no. 2 (April 2009): 213.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Asia-Pacific region Economic Cooperation, "Fact Sheet - Human Security," http://www.apec.org/apec/news___media/fact_sheets/200908fs_humansecurity.html (accessed 6 March 2011).

[11]Nishikawa, 213-236.

[12]Commonwealth of Australia, *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030* (Canberra, ACT: Australian Government Printing Service, 2009).

[13]Ibid.

[14]United Nations.

[15]Hampson, 229-243.

[16]United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,* http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/docnet/courses/operations/ jtfcp/jp1.pdf (accessed 22 March 2011), I-9.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

<u>Background</u>

This study investigates the concept of human security and its application within the Asia-Pacific region. After the end of the Cold War, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) released a report recommending a move from state-centric to people-centric security. The recommended move to a people-centric security approach was termed human security and has been adapted to differing levels throughout the world. The primary research question of this study is: Is a human security policy approach in the Asia-Pacific region in Australia's national security interests? Chapter 1 introduced the three main ways to address human security. The chapter also discussed how those ways differ from traditional security. The problem affecting Australia's security consideration in the Asia-Pacific region is that security policy in the Asia-Pacific region is predominantly state-centric and fails to adequately consider the effects of fear and want amongst the people.

This chapter reviews the existing body of literature that relates to human security, including: (1) national and regional policy documents, (2) academic journals, (3) research from Australian institutions, and (4) research from international agencies. The review includes literature on related topics of relevance to analysis of Australia's interest in a human security policy approach in the Asia-Pacific region. First, this chapter examines the existing definitions of, and approaches to, human security. Second, Australian strategic policy documents, including the 2008 National Security Statement, 2009

Defense White Paper, and 2010 Counter-Terrorism White Paper, are reviewed to determine Australia's national security interests.

The third part of this chapter investigates the dominant unilateral security approaches within the Asia-Pacific region. Reviews include the security policies of all nations represented in the Asia-Pacific region, as defined by chapter 1 of this study. ASEAN members have particular emphasis, as do the individual security policies of the remaining influential nations of China, Japan, R.O.K., Fiji, and New Zealand. This part of the literature review utilizes regional government policy documents, presentations to multilateral meetings, and public statements, to determine regional security threats. Following presentation of the unilateral security approaches, the fourth part of the literature review studies the security approach of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as the primary Asia-Pacific region security community.

Human security definitions and approaches

This part of the literature review examines existing definitions of, and approaches to, human security. After the completion of the Cold War, the UNDP *Human Development Report 1994* presented the need for a change in thinking from nuclear security to human security.[1] This report introduced the defined concept of human security to the international community for the first time. The report also represented a broadening of security interpretation from the traditional focus of protection of territory from external aggression. The UNDP further defined two components to human security: freedom from fear and freedom from want.[2] The two components were not new. Edward Stettinius Jr., former U.S. Secretary of State, and the first U.S. Ambassador to the UN, specifically reported these requirements to his government after the San Francisco conference that led

to the formation of the UN.[3] However, the UNDP Report aimed to use the opportunity presented by the end of the Cold War to refocus the international community on the balance between threats to territory and threats to people.

The final report of the Commission on Human Security (CHS), *Human Security Now*, reinforced the broad approach to human security. The CHS report defined human security as a people-centered concept, which places the individual as the center of analysis.[4] The CHS endorsed the UNDP's use of a multi-sector approach to understanding insecurities across the fields of economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security.[5] Most recently, the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security accepted the broad definition presented by the UNDP and CHS.[6] The Trust Fund utilized broad threats to human security as the baseline from which to recommend operationalization of the concept in local, national, regional and international organizations.

Despite the agreement in definition amongst UN organizations, some scholars in the field of human security have disagreed with the utility of a broad approach. The principal criticism of the broad approach is that, when viewed from this perspective, the concept is too large to analyze and, therefore, loses relevance. Notwithstanding the advocacy of a narrow approach, there is still disagreement on what this approach should be. Andrew Mack, Director of the Human Security Report Project at Simon Fraser University, supported an approach to human security that concentrates on the threat from "war and other forms of violence."[7] This limitation aims to achieve conceptual clarity and uses correlations between violence and the other threat categories presented by the UNDP to analyze security. Simplified, Mack's narrow approach addresses freedom from fear.

14

Nicholas Thomas and William Tow, professors at the University of Queensland Asian Studies Department, also argued that the concept of human security would have "greater analytical and policy value" if it were defined more narrowly.[8] Thomas and Tow defined human security challenges as principally transnational, and sought to dismiss problems such as "food distribution, gender discrimination, and basic shelter" as internal problems that should be addressed as development issues, not security.[9] The trigger for a development problem expanding to the security sphere is when it crosses state borders and assumes international significance.[10] Therefore, Thomas and Tow advocated a narrow definition of human security supportive of traditional state security, and not all encompassing. Yuen Foong Khong, Director of the Center for International Studies at Oxford University, was equally concerned about the broad approach to human security rendering the concept unwieldy and unworkable.[11] Khong argued that the broad approach to human security leaves us with "total paralysis of our ability to prioritize."[12] However, Khong did not recommend a focus for human security and, in fact, dismisses the concept as too universalistic to be of value to security policy development.

Even the CHS, an advocate of the broad approach, understood the problems presented by the scope of human security. When researching their final report, the CHS separated the areas of study into two related parts: conflict and human security, and development and human security.[13] Alex Bellamy and Matt McDonald, professors at the School of Political Science at the University of Queensland, supported the separation of conflict and development for analytical reasons. However, they argued that narrowing the human security focus to those issues that only cross state borders, as done by Thomas and Tow, is unsatisfactory.[14] Bellamy and McDonald proposed that, in many cases, the

threats to individual security were state-sponsored. Excluding development from security discussion and policy formulation, as done by Thomas and Tow, reinforced the source of insecurity for individuals everywhere.[15] Bellamy and McDonald acknowledged the challenges of the broad approach to human security, but advocated that it is only by maintaining the broad approach that human security has any real relevance.

Importantly, the literature reviewed insists that any human security policy agenda, whether broad or narrow, requires action at the state level. As a primary cause of many categories of human insecurity, states have a responsibility to their people. This responsibility has been formalized by 2005 UN World Summit outcome, which supported the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty proposal of the Responsibility to Protect.[16] The Responsibility to Protect reinforces that each state has "the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity."[17] Since scholars agree that individual and state security are mutually supporting, states have a key role in implementing a human security agenda. Therefore, the definition of human security policy used throughout this research is human security ends supported by state-centric means.

<u>Australian strategic policy</u>

This part of the literature review examines Australian security policy to determine Australia's national security interests and policy approach. In recent history, there have been two main approaches to Australian security. These are the 'Defense of Australia' doctrine and an expeditionary, alliance-based approach. The *Dibb Report* shaped the *1987 White Paper: the Defense of Australia*, which proposed the Defense of Australia doctrine. Commissioned by the Labor government of the day to review Defense

capabilities, the *Dibb Report* identified that Australia's 'strategic geography' presented a natural defense against large-scale traditional security threats.[18] Authored by Paul Dibb of the College of Asia and the Pacific within the Australian National University, it made arguments for self-reliance and placed less emphasis on Australia's alliance with the U.S. The move away from this position under conservative coalition government throughout the late 1990s reflected the arguments of Hugh White, a professor within the Strategic Defense Studies Center of the Australian National University, and colleague of Paul Dibb. With the re-election of a Labor government to power in 2007, Australia's defense policy has again undergone a move back towards self-reliance, although with greater balance borne through understanding of the global environment created by the 2001 terror attacks in the U.S.

In his *2008 National Security Statement*, the former Australian Prime Minister, Mr Kevin Rudd, outlined the enduring Australian national security objectives.[19] Challenges such as community safety and low-level criminality remained the remit of the states and territories and excluded from the national security interests. Federally, Rudd defined Australia's national security objectives as:

1. Maintaining Australia's territorial and border integrity.

2. Promoting Australia's political sovereignty.

3. Preserving Australia's cohesive and resilient society, and long-term economic strength.

4. Protecting Australians and Australian interests both at home and abroad.

5. Promoting an international environment, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, that is stable, peaceful and prosperous, together with a global rules-based order that enhances Australia's national interests.[20]

Specifically, Rudd emphasized the need to act multilaterally to ensure the security of the Asia-Pacific region. The geographic proximity of Southeast Asia, combined with persistent political and economic change in that region, present a legitimate national security concern for Australia. In addition, continued security challenges faced by Southwest Pacific Island states require constant cooperation between the members of the PIF.[21]

Rudd delivered the *National Security Statement* shortly after election as Australian Prime Minister. The statement was an evolution of the political arguments made by Rudd when in opposition in 2007 and reflected the left-leaning government's preference for the Defense of Australia approach. As opposition leader, Rudd had loudly criticized the incumbent government for their focus on expeditionary military action in Iraq while "instability in our own region, our own neighborhood, our own backyard, continues to spread."[22] Further, the *National Security Statement* provided the policy foundation for Australia's 2009 Defense White Paper and 2010 Counter-Terrorism White Paper.

Released in May 2009, the Defense White Paper, *Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific region Century: Force 2030,* clarified Australia's national security objectives by outlining specific defense priorities and four specific strategic interests. These interests gave greater clarity to, and directly supported, the five ends outlined by Rudd in the

National Security Statement. The White Paper stated that Australia has the following strategic security interests:

    1. The defense of Australia against armed attack.

    2. The security, stability and cohesion of the immediate neighborhood, shared with Indonesia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Timor Leste, and the South Pacific Island states. In this regard, stability and cohesiveness of Indonesia is in Australia's vital national security interests.

    3. Stability of the wider Asia-Pacific region.

    4. Preservation of an international order that restrains aggression by states against each other and manages threats and risks including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, state fragility and failure, intra-state conflict, and the security impacts of climate change and resource scarcity.[23]

    The 2009 White Paper confirmed that, under a Labor government, Australia once again aspired to a security strategy of self-reliance.[24] However, Australia understood that, where challenges emerged to the national security interests, it did not have the resources to act unilaterally in all cases. Therefore, Australia must be both willing to lead, or make tailored contributions to, military coalitions where there are shared strategic interests at stake.[25] In particular, Australia's immediate focus was on the Asia-Pacific region. The first three priorities for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) directly supported Australia's strategic interests in the region.

    First, the ADF must be able to deter and defeat attacks on Australia by conducting independent military operations.[26] Specifically, the ADF must be able to conduct these operations without reliance on the combat or combat support forces of other countries.

This priority creates the "fundamental interest in controlling the air and sea approaches to (the Australian) continent, if necessary by defeating hostile forces in their bases or staging areas, or attacking them in transit."[27] The focus is on prevention of attack through use of strategic capabilities, with the defense strategy supporting the national security statement's heavy reliance on middle-power diplomacy.[28]

Second, the ADF must contribute to stability and security in the South Pacific and Timor Leste.[29] The elevation of the South Pacific and Timor Leste to the second-highest ADF priority is consistent with the evolving security approach of the Australian Labor Party, Australia's political left, since the late 1990s. During the tenure of John Howard as Prime Minister of Australia, the policy debate over the 'arc of instability' in Australia's immediate vicinity saw a large divide between the conservative government and political left in opposition. In 1997, Australia's defense policy was concerned about both falling behind the economic powers in East Asia, and the possible impact of inter-state conflict amongst the strongest nations in that region: D.P.R.K., R.O.K., China, and Japan.[30] The destabilizing effect of any conflict would have had a direct impact on Southeast Asia and, therefore, presented a security problem for Australia.

The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and corresponding fall of the Suharto regime in Indonesia brought the fear of a destabilized Southeast Asia to the fore.[31] Indonesia's uncertainty in the last years of the 20th century commenced discussion about the 'arc of instability.' However, as analysts further reviewed the situation, the arc expanded to include problem states in the Southwest Pacific. Australian Defense Policy Updates in 2000, 2003, 2005, and 2007 all reflected the challenges of the immediate region. These updates consecutively moved Australia further away from the Defense of Australia policy

foundation of the 1987 White Paper. The direct impacts of the 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S. dominated Australian security policy from their execution until the release of the 2009 White Paper.[32] Elevation of security and stability of the South Pacific and Timor Leste to the second highest security priority for Australia was an evolutionary step and reflected the non-traditional security concerns present in Australia's immediate neighborhood.

Third, the ADF must be able to contribute to military contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region.[33] Australia has an "overwhelming interest" in large-scale conflict avoidance in the Asia-Pacific region, and must be able to contribute to military contingencies in support of the national interest.[34] National commitments to the region are not only military. They also include middle-power diplomacy, information sharing, and economic assistance. Types of response could include inter-agency humanitarian relief, disaster recovery, or non-combatant evacuation. Additionally, threats of terrorism, piracy, and resource insecurity in the Asia-Pacific region potentially undermine Australia's five enduring interests and may warrant a military response. The most likely avenue of approach to the Australian mainland is through the territories of Southeast Asia, and this vulnerability has seen consecutive Australian governments place regional stability very high in the national priorities.[35] Accordingly, Australia's security policy continues to place a strong emphasis on the close bilateral relationship with the U.S. Indeed, Australia considers that the strategic stability of the Asia-Pacific region relies significantly on the constant presence of the U.S. in the Western Pacific.[36]

Australia's 2010 Counter-Terrorism White Paper also emphasized the importance of a stable Southeast Asian region. Since 1998, there have been six terrorist attacks

within the Asia-Pacific region with direct impacts on Australians.[37] Most of these have focused on Indonesia, with the 2002 Bali bombings and 2004 Australian Embassy attack in Jakarta having the highest public profile. Within the Counter-Terrorism White Paper, Australia acknowledged the continuing threat of international jihadist movements, represented by Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia, as the most likely threat to the national interest. Further, Australia recognized that the threat required a coordinated international approach to overcome.[38]

<div align="center">Asia-Pacific region security approaches and threats</div>

The Asia-Pacific region includes well-developed Westernized nations, emerging democracies in developing nations, and authoritarian regimes. The end of the Cold War ended the threat of communism for many nations in the region, particularly in Southeast Asia. Since that time, national security challenges have evolved from purely state-based territorial concerns to include non-traditional security problems. Within the ASEAN nations, the primary stated focus of national military strategies remains protecting nations from military pressure in spite of the fact that ASEAN nations consistently highlight non-traditional challenges to security as the most likely strategic threats. Non-traditional threats include terrorism, natural disasters, climate change, and piracy. Additionally, increasing domestic instability caused by the challenges of development is a pressing concern for the region.

Other than Australia, members of the PIF do not clearly elucidate a national security policy. The nature of many of the Pacific Islands nations directs their strategic interests to development concerns, with security threats emanating from internal factors. Conversely, threats in Northeast Asia are primarily traditional in nature, with enduring

Korean peninsula and China-Taiwan cross-straits tensions at the forefront of national security concerns.

ASEAN nations' security policy

Brunei's Defense White Paper Update 2007, *Shaping the Force Today,* gave far greater emphasis to non-traditional security concerns than in 2004, with the threat of terrorism the most immediate strategic concern.[39] The White Paper Update highlighted that natural disasters, climate change, and other non-traditional security concerns required a comprehensive regional approach to security. Developmental challenges within smaller nations increased domestic instability, and the White Paper concluded that cooperative and consensual regional organizations could help to overcome these challenges. Brunei's White Paper insisted that ASEAN and regional security cooperation are the main ways, and recently conducted peace missions in Cambodia and the Philippines to demonstrate their commitment to regional cooperation.

Cambodia's 2006 Defense White Paper, *Defending the Kingdom of Cambodia,* also reinforced the benefits of ASEAN regional cooperation. The White Paper had a three-way focus; internal security (safety, stability, and social order); development; and a greater focus on international cooperation.[40] While international cooperation was included within the strategy, its practice in Cambodia remains in its infancy. Cambodia's White Paper, in comparison to those of other ASEAN partners, was more concerned about border incursions and rebuilding the country after years of war. Despite the greater emphasis on border incursions, highlighted mostly with the ongoing dispute with Thailand over the Preah Vihear region, Cambodia's White Paper, like that of Brunei, outlined the primary threats as regional and international acts of terror.[41]

Non-traditional threats that undermine the security of society, especially transnational drug activity and illegal weapons transit, present considerable challenges for the Cambodians. Other non-traditional threats, including poor road systems that isolate the population in geographically dispersed areas, and the youth surge created by the end of war in 1998, also complicated the Cambodian security picture. Additionally, the Cambodian government was concerned with food security, climate change, environmental degradation, and poverty.[42] While many of the challenges identified by Cambodia directly relate to freedom from want, the Cambodian approach to security remains state-centric.

Similar to Cambodia, the Philippines views security challenges primarily as internal armed threats to the state, mostly posed by the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf. Additionally, the Philippines reflect regional concerns with threats from natural disasters including earthquakes, floods, volcanic eruptions and landslides. As a developing nation struggling with internal unrest, poverty alleviation remains the Philippines' most pressing human security challenge, with 30 percent of the population classified as poor.[43] As with other ASEAN states, the Philippine security approach remains state-centric.

The focus of Indonesia's current Defense White Paper, *Buku Putih Pertahanan Indonesia 2008*, reflected the structural weakness that characterizes the country and results in internal security being a major preoccupation. The White Paper was primarily concerned with secession, communal and religious violence, ideological tension and political conflict among the elite, national unity, internal order and political stability.[44] In recent times, Indonesia's concerns have evolved to include transnational and non-traditional threats, with these threats now occupying a larger slice of the national security

dialogue. The magnitude of terrorism, piracy, illegal fishing, natural disasters, people and drug trafficking has intensified since the end of the Suharto regime.[45] Insurgencies in Aceh and Papua occupy the attention of the military, and the national security threat presented by Jemaah Islamiyah remains "formidable."[46]

The White Paper also outlined non-traditional threats to Indonesia, including the devastating effect of natural disasters as witnessed in the Indian Ocean Tsunami that hit Aceh province in 2004, and the series of earthquakes in Java, Bengkulu, and West Sumatra from 2005 through 2009.[47] The second series of non-traditional security threats were maritime in nature, relating to piracy, illegal fishing, and trafficking of drugs and people through the Indonesian archipelago. External threats, including sovereign territory disputes, are consistent with the threats perceived by many Southeast Asian countries including Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand and Myanmar. Additionally, breaches of sovereignty in littoral waters had significant economic impacts on Indonesia and posed serious threats to security. The biggest territorial problem Indonesia identified was with Malaysia. They also identified concerns about any shift in balance of power relationships caused by the rise of China. Despite these concerns, Indonesia maintains a close relationship with Malaysia under the ASEAN framework and does not see the need to hedge against China's growth.

As with other ASEAN states, Indonesia's White Paper viewed security through the prism of the state. The White Paper reinforced Indonesia's commitment to international peace and regional stability, emphasizing the importance of diplomacy as the first line of defense. The country retained a strong commitment to bilateral, regional and international cooperation to address national issues; however, Indonesia preferred the

UN model of cooperative security, rather than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization model of collective defense or defense alliance.

Tang Siew Mun of the Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies reviewed Malaysian security policy in 2010 and found that Malaysia, like the majority of ASEAN states, viewed most threats as internal.[48] Despite ongoing territorial disputes, most notably over the Spratly Islands, Malaysia did not perceive an imminent threat from surrounding states. Like other ASEAN nations, the Malay government considered regional cooperation as the key to stability and security. Reflecting Indonesia's approach, Malaysia actively promoted resolution without armed conflict and, like Singapore and the Philippines, saw the ongoing presence of the US as a stabilizing factor. Further reflecting Indonesia's security posture, Malaysia did not view China as a threat and did not see the need to balance against Chinese military build-up.

As opposed to its ASEAN partners, Malaysian security policy directly used the concept of human security. In particular, the effect of 'Transboundary Haze' in the country's south created environmental and social impacts including forced migration, undermining cultural links to the land. [49] Further, Malaysian security policy identified piracy and transnational crime through the Strait of Malacca as human security threats, as they eroded economic development and contributed to human trafficking, smuggling and illegal fishing. The social cost of these challenges reflected developmental problems within Malaysia, under the banner of freedom from want. Despite references to human security and a further emphasis on transnational and non-traditional security, Malaysia's posture does not indicate a complete policy shift. National security remains state-centric.

Singapore's 2004 National Security Strategy, *The Fight Against Terror*, framed security threats to Singapore as principally transnational terrorism. This challenge reflected sentiment in the 2000 National Security Strategy, *Defending Singapore in the 21st Century*, which assessed non-traditional threats to security as more likely than traditional problems. As a small, potentially vulnerable, and well-developed nation by Southeast Asian standards, Singapore's security policy was committed to Asia-Pacific regionalism to ensure sovereignty, survival and prosperity.[50] Additionally, Singapore's lack of strategic depth, caused by a lack of land space, required that the U.S. remain actively engaged in the region. Closer to home, Singapore favored engagement of middle powers such as India and Australia as relevant regional actors. Consistent with other ASEAN states, diplomacy plays a key role in security planning within Singapore. However, where Singapore differs significantly from other ASEAN nations is through its capable military, which provides the other pillar to its defense strategy, deterrence.[51]

Thailand is in the process of drafting a new defense White Paper for the period 2012-2016. Analytical comment anticipates that the new paper will reinforce recent concerns within Thailand. Challenges to Thailand's security reflect those identified by Indonesia, Malaysia and Cambodia. Thailand focuses on internal threats and non-traditional security issues. The influence of the Thai military has maintained the government's focus on traditional threats, principally Myanmar's sponsorship of migration, drugs production and trafficking, and nuclearization.[52] Further, the ongoing friction with Cambodia over the Preah Vihear region, presents a traditional threat to Thailand's security. Despite the military's focus on traditional threats, transnational crime is the main threat to Thailand.[53] Human and drug trafficking through Thailand presents a

clear threat to stability and security within the nation. Further, terrorism and the Southern

Malay-Muslim Insurgency are also concerns. While Thailand understands threats from

non-traditional sources, the military's influence in policy development ensures that

Thailand's security strategy remains state-centric.

Vietnam's 2009 Defense White Paper, *Vietnam's National Defense*, reflected the

nation's desire to "safeguard the homeland."[54] The White Paper clearly outlined

Vietnam's Defense policy and consistently reinforced the requirement to maintain

sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. To achieve these outcomes, the White

Paper stated that Vietnam would avoid conflict and eradicate internal risks created by

non-traditional security threats including trans-border smuggling, illegal migration, and

people and drug smuggling. Vietnam's White Paper strongly reinforced the country's

commitment to ASEAN and bilateral security agreements to help meet these objectives.

This statement was an evolution of previous policies, which have progressively reflected

the greater role of Vietnamese diplomacy in the post-Cold War period. Despite its greater

reliance on bilateral and multilateral relationships to achieve security, Vietnam remains

opposed to alliances.

Reflecting the overall theme of the national security policies of Vietnam,

successive Myanmar governments have adopted state-centric approaches emphasizing

national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity. Similar to Vietnamese

policies prior to the end of the Cold War, the ruling elite within Myanmar view regime

survival and national sovereignty as inseparable. Despite the similarities, following the

end of the Cold War, Vietnamese policy developed a diplomatic focus, while Myanmar

remained focused on maintenance of the Union, national solidarity, and perpetuation of

national sovereignty, at the expense of international relations. Myanmar faces internal threats from ethnic insurgencies, and considers the threat of armed attack from Western nations as a real danger to national survival. Tin Maung Maung Than, Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, argued that, while Myanmar's approach to security was unquestionably state-centric, it failed to address the greatest threats to the national interest.[55] These threats included narcotics trafficking, the spread of communicable diseases, and the refugee exodus to neighboring countries. Than reasoned that Myanmar's neglect of non-traditional and human security concerns was likely to lead to social unrest and present the greatest threat to the military junta and national sovereignty.[56]

<p style="text-align:center">Pacific Islands Forum nations' security policy</p>

New Zealand does not have a clearly articulated national security policy. Despite this, New Zealand's *Defense White Paper 2010*, the first in 13 years, outlined the overall direction for New Zealand defense policy out to 2035. The White Paper articulated four enduring national security interests. These are: (1) a safe and secure New Zealand, including its border and approaches; (2) a rules-based international order, which respects national sovereignty; (3) a network of strong international linkages; and (4) a sound global economy underpinned by open trade routes.[57] To support these interests, the New Zealand Defense Force must be prepared to respond with military force to a direct threat to New Zealand or Australia. Additionally, the New Zealand Defense Force must be capable of working within a coalition to support PIF members facing a similar threat. New Zealand's defense policy focuses on the Asia-Pacific region, with commitment to the Five Powers Defense Agreement and direct support to UN actions within the region

taking high planning priority.[58] The fragility of Southwest Pacific nations is particularly

concerning to New Zealand. The requirements of operating within this region determine

the deployable structure and capability of the New Zealand military. While the threats

within the South Pacific predominantly reflect both non-traditional and human security

challenges, New Zealand has adopted a strong state-centric approach.

Papua New Guinea has not updated its defense policy since the *Defense White*

Paper 1999, although planning guidance issued to the Papua New Guinea Defense Force

in 2008 directed that the strategic assessment remained "broadly appropriate."[59] The

policy objectives outlined in the White Paper are state-centric. Papua New Guinea's

primary security objective is the defense of its people, land, territorial waters, economic

exclusion zone, natural resources, and critical infrastructure. Subordinate security

interests predominantly focus on maintenance of close relationships with defense partners

in the immediate region of Melanesia, and the broader South Pacific. While the White

Paper outlined the reduced threat of conventional attack following the fall of the Suharto

regime in Indonesia, military development guidance issued in 2008 reflected broader

regional concerns with transnational threats, including terrorism.[60]

Solomon Islands does not have a clearly defined national security strategy. As a

nation emerging from the violent internal ethnic conflict of 1998-2003, Solomon Islands'

security threats remain internal and largely focus on development issues. Solomon

Islands does not maintain armed forces, relying instead on local security provided by a

constabulary and defense agreements with the middle-powers of Australia and New

Zealand. This approach is consistent amongst the smaller Pacific Islands nations,

including Kiribati, Nauru, Cook Islands, Samoa, Niue, Federated States of Micronesia,

Palau, Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.[61] Each of these nations addresses human security concerns through a national development strategy, which aims to address freedom from want.

Development is also the primary objective of Tonga who, in a different approach to most other PIF nations, retain a standing Defense Service to defend the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Tonga. Despite the state-centric mission of the Tongan Defense Service, the principal security approach of Tonga retains a development focus. The *Kingdom of Tonga Strategic Development Plan* outlines the approach.[62] The plan focuses on improving governance and sustaining economic growth, with the threat of natural disaster the most prevalent security risk. Additionally, Tonga identifies that a lack of development may lead to food shortages as pollution and environmental health factors undermine food security and have the greatest impact on the 23 percent of Tongans living in poverty.

Although currently suspended from the PIF due to its long transition back to democracy following the 2006 military coup, many nations consider Fiji to be the hub of the Pacific.[63] Much of the local region's trade moves through Fiji, and Suva is the base for international diplomatic missions servicing the South Pacific. Fiji is unique in the South Pacific Islands community as the only nation with a large standing military. Additionally, Fiji has been subject to four military coups since 1987, including in 2006, which led to the installation of the current military-backed interim regime.[64] There have been no updates to Fiji's published strategic security policy since the 2006 coup. Therefore, the most recent policy document, released but not implemented, *Draft White Paper 2005–A Safe and Prosperous Fiji*, has considerable limitations when analyzing Fiji's security policy. Despite its limitations, the Draft White Paper still provides a sound

foundation from which to view Fiji's overall security challenges, as these have not changed markedly in the intervening period.

The Draft White Paper outlined interstate conflict, international non-state conflict, transnational crime, and natural and manmade disasters as the security threats and challenges facing Fiji.[65] The Chief of the Royal Fiji Military Force and former Head of State, Commodore Josea (Frank) Bainimarama, in his Commander's Intent 2011, restated these threats and outlined the four pillars of Fijian National Interest: (1) the guarantee of Fiji's sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence; (2) development and preservation of democracy, welfare, security, and safety of Fiji's people; (3) maintenance of human security and stability of society; and (4) meeting regional and international commitments.[66]

Commodore Bainimarama's policy deviates from that of the late 20th century by alienating Fiji from traditional allies including Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S. Instead, Fiji is pursuing closer ties with China, India, Russia, and the ASEAN nations through its "Look North" policy.[67] This approach has made Fiji more susceptible to military intervention from its middle-power neighbors and increased the risk of traditional security challenges when they are reducing in most other parts of the region. Despite the escalation in traditional security risk, inclusion of human security challenges in military policy represents an aspiration to the broad view of human security while still balancing traditional security concerns. However, as discussed by Sandra Tarte, Director of the Politics and International Affairs Program at the University of the South Pacific, opinions remain divided "over whether or not the military is a source of insecurity within Fiji or the final guarantor of its security."[68]

Northeast Asian security policy

The security situation described in *China's National Defense 2010*, a White paper released in March 2011, outlines a trend towards peace, development, and cooperation. The Chinese government connects Chinese security with world peace through the commitment to the security concepts of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and coordination. However, it also identifies local, regional, and global challenges and the development of increasingly complex, integrated, and volatile security threats.[69] These threats include the traditional challenges of separatist actions in Taiwan, Tibet, and East Turkistan. According to the White Paper, each of these regions inflicts serious damage on national security and social stability within China, and builds pressure on the maintenance of China's territorial integrity.

Additionally, *China's Defense 2010* identifies rising non-traditional security concerns including terrorism, energy, resources, finance, information, and natural disasters.[70] The combination of traditional and non-traditional challenges to national interests generates a complex security environment. To address the challenges presented within this environment, China's focus will remain on the concepts of peace, stability, equality, mutual trust, and cooperation. Where challenged, China will ensure territorial sovereignty through defensive actions in the interests of national development. China has no aspirations to hegemony or military expansionism.

China's White Paper presents an awareness of U.S. efforts to strengthen ties with partners in the Asia-Pacific region, but does not directly attribute this to a threat. Conversely, some scholars and hardline Chinese nationalists see US-Sino relations as a zero-sum game.[71] They propose that China should be pushing to take the place of the

U.S. as the dominant power within the region by capitalizing on the current economic environment. Despite the noise from hardliners, Chinese policy remains one of "peaceful development," with China looking to exploit opportunities for accelerated national development within a cooperative and peaceful world.[72]

China has recently strengthened ties with ASEAN on non-traditional security concerns. Cooperation between China and ASEAN has increased in the non-military threat fields of piracy, drug and human trafficking, transnational crime, cyber threats, and terrorism.[73] This should not, however, be confused with a commitment to human security. The China-ASEAN combined definition of non-traditional security fails to mention human security as a principle. In fact, under the official China-ASEAN declaration to explain non-traditional security cooperation, the only purpose is for ensuring state sovereignty.[74] Therefore, despite China's increased focus on non-traditional threats, the security policy remains state-centric.

The Japanese Ministry of Defense released its latest White Paper, *Defense of Japan 2011*, in August of this year. Unsurprisingly, it gives considerable attention to the effects of the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11. Additionally, traditional security concerns directly related to the activity of close neighbors D.P.R.K., China, and Russia, are prevalent throughout the document.[75] Further threats to local, regional and global stability are non-traditional and include cyber-attacks, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, and weakening of government systems. As one of the leading voices in support of a human security policy agenda through the late 20th and early 21st century, it is interesting to note the White Paper makes no direct reference to

the concept.[76] In its place is a renewed focus on traditional and non-traditional security

concerns, with the state reinforced as the primary referent.

The three Japanese security principles are: (1) prevention and elimination of

potential threats to Japan; (2) stabilization of the security environment of the Asia-Pacific

region; and (3) contribution to world peace and stability and establishing security for the

people.[77] This relegation of the concept of human security, championed by the Japanese

over the last 20 years, demonstrates a reconsideration of threats within Northeast Asia. In

particular, both traditional and non-traditional threats to national sovereignty are of

greater importance to the Japanese government than in recent history. Japan remains

committed to assisting international partners through Official Development Assistance.

Despite this commitment, contemporary policy adjustments focus more on international

cooperation to reduce the threat of armed aggression and instability, rather than the

aspirational goals of security through development alone.

The preservation of national independence through international cooperation is a

consistent theme throughout the White Paper. In particular, Japan sees the need to deepen

ties with the U.S. and actively advance regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region to

ensure stability and protect the country.[78] This approach reflects that of other credible

powers within the region including Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore. While

heavily reliant on cooperation, the Japanese Constitution precludes involvement in

collective self-defense activities. The commitment of Japanese forces to the defense of a

foreign country with which Japan has close relations contravenes Article 9 of the

Constitution.[79] Article 9 only allows for the use of force in defending against an

imminent and illegal act of aggression against Japan. The shift towards a more traditional

security policy approach brings Japan more in line with the R.O.K.

The *Defense White Paper 2008* describes in comprehensive detail the national

defense policy of the R.O.K. Given the continued tension on the Korean peninsula, it is

not surprising to note the threats of conventional attack and potential use of weapons of

mass destruction rate at the top of challenges facing the R.O.K. Indeed, the first chapter

of the White Paper is dedicated to detailed analysis of D.P.R.K. strategic policy and

military capability.[80] Additionally, the R.O.K. identifies unresolved tension between

Japan and China or Japan and Russia over territorial disputes, as the cause of additional

unrest within their immediate region that may present a traditional threat.[81] Despite the

prevalence of traditional threats on the Korean peninsula, the R.O.K. White Paper also

identifies non-traditional security concerns including international terrorism and cyber-

attack as state-centric issues. Additionally, threats including contagious diseases, natural

disasters, climate change, and environmental pollution are "major pending issues."[82]

Despite their inclusion, these threats do not receive detailed discussion either as state-

centric or human security problems.

To address the threats facing the R.O.K., there are three national security

objectives: (1) maintaining stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula; (2) building

firmly the foundation for the nation's security and national prosperity; and (3) enhancing

competence and status internationally.[83] Translating these strategic ends into ways

focuses on the continued R.O.K.-U.S. strategic alliance and increasing cooperative

relationships with regional neighbors, including Australia. The means for these activities

are entirely state-centric and focus largely on diplomatic relations and a build-up of

military capability to respond to changes in the security environment. In particular, the

military strategic task of contribution to regional stability and world peace aims to

promote cordial and cooperative military relations in accordance with state-centric

security capabilities.[84] In this way, the R.O.K. policy is more direct in its

acknowledgement of a state-centric security strategy than much of the region, including

its close neighbor Japan.

<div align="center">The ASEAN Regional Forum</div>

As the principal security community with the region, ASEAN provides the

foundation for understanding how formalized transnational security operates within the

Asia-Pacific region. ASEAN consists of 10 member nations, all geographically located in

Southeast Asia. Under the *Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations*,

member nations are "united by a common desire and collective will to live in a region of

lasting peace, security and stability."[85] The purposes of ASEAN include security and

development objectives, with protection of human rights and response to transnational

crime and transboundary challenges specifically cited.[86] However, the principle of non-

interference potentially undermines the ability of ASEAN to meet these challenges.

Independence and sovereignty without external interference, subversion, and coercion are

the pillars of the ASEAN Way and represent an example of Asian diplomatic norms.[87]

1994 saw the expansion of ASEAN with the creation of the ARF, consisting of all

ASEAN members and fellow Asia-Pacific region nations including Australia, China,

D.P.R.K., Japan, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, R.O.K., and Timor Leste. In

addition, the Asian nations of Bangladesh, India, Mongolia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are

members of the ARF. Finally, global middle- and great-powers including Canada, the

European Union, Russian Federation, and the U.S. make up the ARF membership.[88] Despite its global reach, the ARF directly focuses on Southeast Asia, with the agenda centering on cooperative security, capacity building, information sharing, and intelligence sharing on terrorism.[89]

The *ARF Concept Paper*, released in 1995, identified the challenges facing Southeast Asia as rapid economic development affected the regional power balance. Further challenges included culturally diverse approaches to security and unresolved territorial disputes within Southeast Asia.[90] While the ARF gained membership from global partners and focused security attention within Southeast Asia, the challenges and potential solutions to problems remained state-centric. Therefore, while confidence-building measures and preventative diplomacy were central to ARF establishment, the principle of non-interference retained primacy. Any efforts to implement a human security approach within the Asia-Pacific region must remain aware of this significant limitation.

<u>Literature Review Summary</u>

This chapter reviewed the existing body of literature addressing the complexity of human security understanding. The chapter also studied national security approaches across the Asia-Pacific region. The UN Human Development Program introduced the concept of human security following the end of the Cold War as a recommended change in global security approach. The concept has both narrow and broad definitions, with the narrow definition advocating protection from violence under the banner of freedom from fear. The broad definition expands human security as it also addresses development concerns under freedom from want. Other UN organizations support the broad

understanding of human security as a policy approach, although academics have identified concerns with the scope of such a methodology.

The literature review determined that separating traditional and human security was unrealistic, and defined a human security policy approach as human security ends supported by state-centric means. However, there has been limited analysis of human security applied to traditional and non-traditional threats to national security interests. This study helps fill this gap by analyzing the potential of a human security policy approach within the Asia-Pacific region, and its impact on Australia's national security interests.

Australia's national policy documents clearly identify national security interests. To this end, the literature review was able to answer the secondary research question; what are Australia's national security interests and how do they relate to the Asia-Pacific region? To ensure security of territorial and political sovereignty, Australia's security interests lie in stability of the immediate neighborhood and broader Asia-Pacific region. Threats to Australia's national security interests are predominantly in the northern approaches to the Australian continent, and affected by instability in the Southwest Pacific. While not anticipating traditional military threats, Australia identifies global and regional non-traditional challenges with the potential to undermine national security interests. The literature review identified changes to Australian defense policy throughout the past 25 years, with the competing doctrines of Defense of Australia and expeditionary alliance-based policy fluctuating with the sitting government. Despite the subtle variations in defense policy, the identified national security interests are enduring.

The literature review also addressed the secondary research question; what are the dominant national security approaches in the Asia-Pacific region? The literature review identified three sub-regions within the Asia-Pacific region, each with different security challenges. First, Southeast Asia has a balance of traditional and non-traditional security threats. Despite enduring territorial concerns related to access to the global commons in places such as the Spratly Islands and Strait of Malacca, non-traditional challenges have taken primacy. Conversely, Northeast Asian nations identify non-traditional security challenges, but remain focused on the traditional military challenges presented by friction on the Korean peninsula, China-Taiwan cross-straits issues, and independence movements in China. Despite the variation in challenges, both Southeast and Northeast Asian nations have state-centric approaches to security. Southwest Pacific nations, less Fiji, focus on development concerns and are reliant on Australia and New Zealand for middle-power diplomacy and military support. While the challenges within the Southwest Pacific seem suited to a human security policy approach, the lack of clear strategic policy guidance within these nations makes it impossible to determine the current policy paradigm.

Finally, the literature review examined the membership and operating concept of the main security community in the Asia-Pacific region, the ARF. The review determined that any transnational approach to security in the Asia-Pacific region must understand, and work within, the ASEAN principle of non-interference. This limitation will have a significant impact on any attempt to introduce a human security policy approach in the region. The next chapter outlines the research methodology utilized in the conduct of this study.

[1]United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

[2]Ibid.

[3]United Nations Development Programme, 24.

[4]Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now* (Washington, DC: Communications Development Incorporated, 2003).

[5]For consistent application, see United Nations Development Programme; Commission on Human Security.

[6]United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, *Human Security in Theory and Practice: Application of the Human Security Concept and the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security* (New York: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2009).

[7]Andrew Mack, "A Signifier of Shared Values," *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 3 (September 2004): 367.

[8]Thomas and Tow, 178.

[9]Ibid., 179.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Yuen Foong Khong, "Human Security: A Shotgun Approach to Alleviating Human Misery?" *Global Governance* 7, no. 3 (July 2001): 231.

[12]Ibid., 233.

[13]Pauline Kerr, "The Evolving Dialectic between State-Centric and Human-Centric Security," https://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/42112 (accessed 4 May 2011).

[14]Alex J. Bellamy and M. McDonald, "'The Utility of Human Security': Which Humans? what Security? A Reply to Thomas and Tow," *Security Dialogue* 33, no. 3 (September 2002): 373.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Gareth Evans, *The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for all* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 349.

[17]Ibid., 48.

[18]Commonwealth of Australia, *The Defense of Australia* (Canberra, ACT: Australian Government Printing Service, 1987).

[19]Mr. Rudd was Prime Minister of Australia from November 2007 until defeated by Julia Gillard in a leadership ballot held by the 115 member Labor caucus on 24 June 2010.

[20]Kevin Rudd, "National Security Statement to the Parliament," http://pmrudd. archive.dpmc.gov.au/node/5424 (accessed 23 April 2011).

[21]Ibid.

[22]Robert Ayson, "The 'Arc of Instability' and Australia's Strategic Policy," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 61, no. 2 (June 2007): 215.

[23]Commonwealth of Australia, *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*.

[24]Ibid.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Ibid.

[27]Ibid., 41.

[28]Rudd.

[29]Commonwealth of Australia, *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*.

[30]Ayson, 215-231.

[31]Ibid.

[32]Ibid.

[33]Commonwealth of Australia, *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*.

[34]Ibid., 55.

[35]Ayson, 215-231.

[36]Commonwealth of Australia, *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*.

[37]Commonwealth of Australia, *Counter-Terrorism White Paper: Securing Australia - Protecting our Community* (Canberra, ACT: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2010).

[38]Ibid.

[39]Royal Brunei Armed Forces, *Defence White Paper Update 2007: Shaping the Force Today*, http://www.mindef.gov.bn/new_home/whitepaper2007/english.pdf (accessed 7 May 2011).

[40]Kingdom of Cambodia, *Defense Policy of the Kingdom of Cambodia, 2006: Security, Development and International Cooperation* (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: Kingdom of Cambodia, 2006), 1.

[41]Ibid.

[42]Chap Sotharith, "Cambodia's Security Challenges and Implications for Defense Policy." *National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, Joint Research Series* 5 (October 2010): 95-106.

[43]Noel M. Morada, "The Philippine's Security Outlook in 2010," *National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, Joint Research Series* 5 (October 2010): 47.

[44]The author was unable to find an English translation for Indonesia's security policy. Policy analysis conducted by the Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies is the primary source within this review. The policy review can be found at Rizal Sukma, "Indonesia's Security Outlook, Defense Policy and Regional Cooperation," *National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, Joint Research Series* 5 (October, 2010): 3.

[45]Ibid.

[46]Buku Putih Pertahanan Indonesia 2008 [Indonesia's Defence White Paper 2008] translated and cited in Sukma, 5.

[47]Ibid.

[48]The author was unable to find and English translation for Malaysian security policy. Policy analysis conducted by the Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies is the primary source within this review. The policy review can be found at Tang Siew Mun, "Malaysia's Security Outlook and Challenges," *National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, Joint Research Series* 5 (October 2010): 25.

[49]Ibid., 33.

[50]Peng Er Lam, "Singapore's Security Outlook: The Immutability of History, Geography and Demography?" *National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, Joint Research Series* 5 (October 2010): 55.

[51]Government of Singapore, *The Fight Against Terror: Singapore's National Security Strategy* (Singapore: National Security Coordination Centre, 2004), 1.

[52]Pavin Chachavalpongpun, "Thailand's New Defense White Paper," http://web1. iseas.edu.sg/?p=2769 (accessed 13 August 2011).

[53]Ibid.

[54]Socialist Republic of Vietnam, *Vietnam National Defense - 2009*, http://merln. ndu.edu/whitepapers/Vietnam2009.pdf (accessed 7 May 2011), 8.

[55]Tin Maung Maung Than, "Tatmadaw and Myanmar's Security Challenges," *National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, Joint Research Series* 5 (October 2010): 123.

[56]Ibid.

[57]New Zealand Government, *Defence White Paper 2010* (Wellington, New Zealand: New Zealand Ministry of Defence, 2010), 1-100.

[58]The Five Powers Defense Agreement includes Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand, Australia, and the United Kingdom.

[59]Papua New Guinea Department of Defence, *Key Assumptions for Defence Planning and Force Development 2008-2012*, http://www.defence.gov.pg/ (accessed 27 May 2011).

[60]Ibid.

[61]Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, "Pacific Islands," www.child-soldiers.org/document/get?id=867 (accessed 28 May 2011).

[62]Kingdom of Tonga, *Looking to the Future, Building on the Past: Kingdom of Tonga Development Plan 8* (Vava'u, Tonga: Kingdom of Tonga, 2008), 1-190.

[63]Sandra Tarte, "Fiji Islands' Security Challenges and Defense Policy Issues," *National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, Joint Research Series*, no. 5 (October 2010): 67.

[64]Ibid.

[65]Government of Fiji, *Draft White Paper 2005 - A Safe and Prosperous Fiji* (Suva, Fiji: Government of Fiji, 2005).

[66]Josea Bainimarama, "Commander's Intent 2011," http://www.rfmf.mil.fj/news/ Commanders%20Intent.html (accessed 3 June 2011).

[67]Ibid.

[68]Tarte, 82.

[69]Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "China's National Defense in 2010," www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7114675.htm (accessed 24 May 2011).

[70]Ibid.

[71]William T. Tow and Richard Rigby, "China's Pragmatic Security Policy: The Middle-Power Factor," *China Journal*, no. 65 (January 2011): 157.

[72]Ibid., 165.

[73]David Arase, "Non-Traditional Security in China-ASEAN Cooperation," *Asian Survey* 50, no. 4 (July 2010): 808.

[74]Ibid.

[75]Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2011* (Tokyo, Japan: Japanese Ministry of Defense, 2011).

[76]Ibid.

[77]Ibid.

[78]Ibid.

[79]Ibid.

[80]Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, *Defense White Paper 2008* (South Korea: Defense Policy Division, Ministry of National Defense, 2008), 1-378.

[81]Ibid.

[82]Ibid.

[83]Ibid.

[84]Ibid.

[85]Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations," http://www.asean.org/AC.htm (accessed 22 May 2011).

[86]Ibid.

[87]Jonathan K. Chen, "Building an Asia-Pacific region Security Community: A Role for Australia?" (Honour's Thesis, Macalaster College, 2011), 1.

[88]ASEAN Regional Forum, "About Us," http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/ about.html (accessed 13 August 2011).

[89]Chen, 1-138.

[90]ASEAN Regional Forum, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper," http://www.asean.org/ 3635.htm (accessed 13 August 2011).

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

<u>Background</u>

This study evaluates the application of human security policy and investigates whether its implementation in the Asia-Pacific region is in Australia's national security interests. Chapter 1 introduced the concept of human security and differentiated it from traditional security. The chapter also presented the three main approaches to human security and introduced the concepts of freedom from fear and freedom from want, concluding that separation of these concepts in a policy framework is unrealistic. Chapter 1 discussed the recent evolution from state-centric to people-centric security in the Asia-Pacific region, along with the inherent challenges of addressing transnational threats while restricted by the ASEAN Way of non-interference. Discussion of Australia's strategic interests in Southeast Asia and the South-Pacific followed, including Australia's recent call for the establishment of an Asia-Pacific region Community. Ultimately, chapter 1 presented two problems:

1. Security policy in the Asia-Pacific region is predominantly state-centric.

2. There has been limited analysis of human security applied to traditional and non-traditional threats to national security interests.

Chapter 2 reviewed the existing body of literature that relates to human security. The review included literature on related topics of relevance to analysis of Australia's interest in a human security policy approach in the Asia-Pacific region. The chapter analyzed the existing definitions of, and approaches to, human security, identifying both narrow and broad definitions. The literature review determined that separating traditional

and human security was unrealistic, and defined a human security policy approach as human security ends supported by state-centric means.

The literature review concluded that Australia's national policy documents clearly define the national security interests, which are reliant on stability of the immediate neighborhood and broader Asia-Pacific region. In doing so, the review answered the secondary research question; what are Australia's national security interests and how do they relate to the Asia-Pacific region? Further, chapter 2 identified the existence of three sub-regions within the Asia-Pacific region, each with different security challenges and policy approaches. This answered the secondary research question; what are the dominant national security approaches in the Asia-Pacific region? Finally, the review determined that any transnational approach to security in the Asia-Pacific region must understand, and work within, the ASEAN principle of non-interference. This limitation will have a significant impact on any attempt to introduce a human security policy approach in the region.

Research Methodology

This chapter outlines the research methodology used for the conduct of this study. This exploratory study employed a qualitative methodology to answer the primary research question: is a human security policy approach for the Asia-Pacific region in Australia's national security interests? The research comprised three main parts.

Australia's national security interests

The first part investigated Australia's national security interests in the Asia-Pacific region. The methodology used for this part was a qualitative review of Australian

strategic policy to determine the priority of Asia-Pacific region security and stability. The research determined the level of Australian involvement in security response to traditional and non-traditional threats in the Asia-Pacific region since the end of the Cold War.

Asia-Pacific region security

The second part of this study determined the dominant collective and national security approaches in the Asia-Pacific region. This entailed a qualitative review of the collective and national security policies of ASEAN and PIF members, and the national security policies of China, Japan, the R.O.K., and Fiji. The research identified threats within the Asia-Pacific region and categorized them as either traditional or non-traditional challenges.

Policy analysis

The third part of this study involved a qualitative assessment of traditional and human security policy effectiveness in the three identified sub-regions of the Asia-Pacific region. Analysis of Northeast Asia addressed the security threat identified on the Korean Peninsula. Southeast Asian analysis focused on the threat posed by maritime insecurity, in particular in the Malacca Strait and South China Sea. Analysis of the Southwest Pacific addressed the non-traditional threat posed by climate change and the associated rise in sea level. The qualitative study assessed traditional and non-traditional threats against several criteria:

1. What are the relevant Australian national security interests associated with the threat?

2. How does the threat affect sovereignty of the countries involved?

3. How does the threat affect the people of the countries involved?

4. How do these threats affect relevant Australian security interests?

5. Would a human security policy approach limit the adverse effects on

Australia's national security interests?

The format displayed in Table 2 combined the policy analysis to determine that

application of a human security approach in the Asia-Pacific region was in Australia's

national security interests. Appendix A contains the completed policy analysis.

Table 2. Criteria for summary of policy analysis					
Region	**Threat**	**Countries affected**	**Relevant Australian national security interests**	**Effects on sovereignty**	**Effects on people**
NE Asia	Korean Peninsula				
SE Asia	Maritime security				
SW Pacific	Climate change				

Source: Created by author.

The next chapter presents the analysis.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Background

This study addresses the application of human security within the Asia-Pacific region. The existing body of literature revealed clearly defined Australian national security interests. These interests rely on stability of the immediate neighborhood and broader Asia-Pacific region. Further, the literature revealed three sub-regions within the Asia-Pacific region and the varied security challenges and policy approaches affecting each locality. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula, maritime security in Southeast Asia, and climate change impacts in the Southwest Pacific present both traditional and non-traditional security threats across the Asia-Pacific region. This chapter presents an analysis of these threats and their impact on Australia's national security interests. The methodology used for this chapter is as outlined in chapter 3. The primary research question is: Is a human security policy approach in the Asia-Pacific region in Australia's national security interests?

Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula

Allied victory in the Pacific theater of World War II ended 35 years of Japanese colonial rule on the Korean Peninsula. In 1945, Soviet and U.S. forces respectively established occupied zones in the northern and southern parts of the Peninsula. The northern region's refusal to take part in U.N. sponsored elections in 1948 resulted in the formation of two separate governments. The 38th parallel demarcated territorial

sovereignty. In the D.P.R.K., the Soviets installed a communist regime headed by Kim Il-sung, while the U.S. supported an anti-communist government in the R.O.K.[1]

The outbreak of war between the two countries in 1950 ended immediate hopes of reunification. The 1953 armistice fell short of permanently resolving the conflict, with the countries still formally at war. Since the signing of the armistice, both the D.P.R.K. and R.O.K. have adopted significantly different domestic and foreign policy approaches. These approaches result in both traditional and human security threats that affect the Peninsula and surrounding countries of China, Russia, and Japan. Due to obligations created under the 1953 bilateral Mutual Defense Treaty, these threats also affect Australia's primary strategic ally, the U.S.

North Korean policy approach

The D.P.R.K. is inherently suspicious of outside interference. To counter this suspicion, the ruling Worker's Party of Korea operates mutual policy approaches of *juche* (self-reliance) and *sonkun* (military first).[2] The *juche* policy approach decrees economic self-sufficiency within a communist framework. *Sonkun* dictates that the majority of the country's resources are dedicated to military capability. The D.P.R.K. military comprises approximately 1.1 million troops, with the Party leadership relying heavily on military support for legitimacy.[3] Due to this requirement, D.P.R.K. foreign policy consistently demonstrates a hardline approach towards the R.O.K. In recent times, this has manifested in the sinking of the R.O.K. warship *Cheonan* in March 2010 and an attack on the West Sea island of Yeonpyeong in November 2010.[4]

Both *juche* and *sonkun* have domestic and foreign implications, with international isolation the most noticeable by-product. Additionally, the D.P.R.K. has aggressively

pursued a nuclear program, self-identified as a critical strategic advantage within the region.[5] Denuclearization dominates international security dialogue with the D.P.R.K. and is the primary goal of the Six-Party talks with the U.S., China, Japan, Russia, and the R.O.K. The D.P.R.K. has stated it would denuclearize in return for a peace treaty and full U.S. diplomatic relations. However, historical inconsistency and opacity in D.P.R.K. foreign policy challenge the validity of this statement.

Domestically, aided by heavy economic assistance from China and the Soviet Union, the D.P.R.K. achieved high economic growth rates until the late 1960s. After this time, growth leveled off to approximately 5 percent in the 1970s and 1980s. The *juche* policy sought economic prosperity through socialist production and distribution, excluding the nation from the growing global market.[6] Ultimately, the D.P.R.K. identified that it did not possess sufficient agricultural capacity to support the population. Policies throughout the 1970s and 1980s attempted to increase farmland and establish food security for the people. However, poorly planned and executed land conversion policies resulted in crop destruction due to topsoil erosion and river silting.

The D.P.R.K. rationing system forms one component of national social security and population control under *juche*. Collectively, failed agricultural policies and the removal of funding linked to the breakup of the Soviet Union forced the D.P.R.K. to become reliant on alternate foreign food imports and external aid. The 1991 "let's eat two meals a day" policy confirmed that the socialist government could no longer provide the promised rations.[7] In 2002, the D.P.R.K. regime decreased national assurance of rations, medical support, and welfare. This change increased individual responsibility to provide for oneself; however, the bans on free movement and market participation remained.[8]

Therefore, many individuals now face the choice between starvation and risking the punitive treatment issued to those who break state rules.

<p style="text-align:center">South Korean policy approach</p>

Since the end of World War II, the R.O.K. has depended heavily on the U.S. for military assistance. Close U.S.-R.O.K. bilateral relations also contributed to trade opportunities, which have helped the R.O.K. expand to become Asia's fourth largest economy.[9] Economic considerations continue to have a high priority within R.O.K. foreign policy circles as it seeks to increase its regional and global role.

The R.O.K. transitioned from military to civilian rule over the period 1988 to 1993. The country is now a well-established democracy whose domestic and foreign policy approaches are subject to the results of the electoral process. Traditionally, the R.O.K. favored a pro-business approach. However, recent elections have delivered more pro-working class policies directed at improving welfare services while balancing economic reform.[10] The subtle changes currently experienced within R.O.K. politics are consistent with established democracies.

In North-South relations, the R.O.K. government announced the Sunshine Policy in 1998. The Sunshine Policy aimed to increase cooperation with the D.P.R.K., rather than seek absorption or complete reunification. While aimed at increased cooperation, the Sunshine Policy also stated that the South would not tolerate Northern armed provocation. The intent of the policy was to lessen tension through bilateral and multilateral relationships affecting the Korean Peninsula.[11] D.P.R.K. nuclear and missile testing in 2006 saw the Sunshine Policy openly challenged in R.O.K. foreign policy circles. The election of Lee-Myung Bak to the R.O.K. presidency in 2008 saw a harder

line reemerge and, following further D.P.R.K. nuclear testing, sinking of the *Cheonan,* and shelling of Yeonpeong islands, the government officially revoked the Sunshine Policy in November 2010.[12]

The R.O.K. has generally responded to D.P.R.K. antagonism with some level of restraint. However, the 2010 attacks on the *Cheonan* and Yeonpeong resulted in a strengthening of the Rules of Engagement and increased military presence in the West Sea. Further, the South has increased efforts to foster insurrection in the North.[13] The R.O.K. military consists of approximately 700,000 troops, with an additional 25,000 U.S. troops permanently stationed on the Peninsula. The 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty commits the U.S. to assist the R.O.K. in case of external aggression. In recent years, lead responsibility for security has transitioned to R.O.K. forces with the U.S. heavily committed in the Middle East and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the R.O.K. cites the full strength of the U.S. military as reliable asset if tensions with the D.P.R.K. expand to full conflict.[14]

Implications for security

Korean foreign and domestic policies have implications for traditional and non-traditional security on the Peninsula. Fear or want generated in the D.P.R.K. can cause migration into neighboring countries such as the R.O.K. and China, generating security concerns for the recipient country. Further, the R.O.K. has concerns about territorial sovereignty caused by an aggressive D.P.R.K., with whom they are still formally at war. Additionally, the R.O.K. is apprehensive about refugee movement and the more overt threat of a nuclear capable northern neighbor.

Enduring tensions between the two Koreas clearly present traditional threats to the territorial sovereignty of both nations. Aggressive, hardline policies from both the D.P.R.K. and R.O.K. are likely to generate more Peninsular military clashes. Combined with the expected succession of Kim Jong-un to the Party leadership, the risk of large-scale traditional conflict is significant. As Kim Jong-un has no soldiering credentials, he may feel the need to flex his muscle to earn military respect. Miscalculation of either intent or action may exacerbate the pressures already existent within the Peninsula and lead to a large-scale conflict. Further, as denuclearization continues to dominate international dialogue due to the aggressive nature of the D.P.R.K. nuclear and missile programs, the threat of international action to counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains.

In addition to traditional security threats, the developmental challenges of poverty and starvation present immediate internal security threats within the D.P.R.K. Hunger, poor health, and the effect of natural disasters have generated want within the majority of the community. This want has in turn driven many to either engage in criminal activity to survive or to flee across the international borders with China and the R.O.K. In these cases, the existence of want is creating environments of fear as criminal violence threatens communities and the D.P.R.K. takes punitive action against those forcibly returned. Further, breakdown of the family unit within the D.P.R.K. has increased rates of human trafficking and sexual violence, predominantly against women. These human security concerns work together with R.O.K. efforts to propagate insurrection in the D.P.R.K. and further destabilize conditions on the Korean Peninsula. If the D.P.R.K. population becomes more aware of uneven resource distribution, discontent will rise and

further undermine unity. This creates an internal security concern for the D.P.R.K., forcing them to direct resources to managing instability and away from traditional threat management.

<center>Australia's security interests</center>

Australia's 2009 Defense White Paper does not specifically address the Korean Peninsula as being in its national security interests. However, Korea falls under the wider Asia-Pacific region banner, the stability of which is Australia's third strategic security priority.[15] Additionally, Australia's fourth strategic security policy seeks to preserve "an international order that restrains aggression by states against each other and manages threats and risks including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, . . . state fragility and failure, intra-state conflict, and the security impacts of . . . resource scarcity."[16] Further, Australia has recently strengthened economic and military ties with the R.O.K., thereby enhancing the bilateral relationship and increasing fiscal interests within the region. The 2009 Defense White Paper lists the R.O.K. as Australia's fourth most significant strategic partnership.[17] Therefore, addressing the security concerns on the Korean Peninsula is in Australia's national security interests.

Security challenges on the Korean Peninsula cover a range of traditional and non-traditional concerns that are within Australia's security interests. Traditional challenges to state sovereignty disrupt stability on both the Korean Peninsula and immediate Northeast Asian region. Australia's growing relationship with the R.O.K., coupled with continuing strong relationships with both the U.S. and Japan, mean that a traditional security policy approach within Northeast Asia remains relevant. In particular,

<center>57</center>

denuclearization of the Peninsula and increased governmental transparency remain

prerequisites to normalization of relations with the D.P.R.K.

However, many problems germinating within the D.P.R.K. and spilling over to

surrounding countries also fit a human security framework. The twin development

challenges of poverty and starvation must have the individual as the principal referent.

Human rights abuses within the D.P.R.K. also present clear human security challenges.

Despite this, given the complexity of issues on the Korean Peninsula, a human security

policy approach that ignored state-centric means would be insufficient. Therefore, it is in

Australia's national security interests to implement a security policy within Northeast

Asia that stresses the importance of resolving traditional threats, while directly citing

human security as a required policy outcome. Table 3 summarizes policy analysis for the

Korean Peninsula.

Table 3. Summary of policy analysis for the Korean Peninsula					
Region	**Threat**	**Countries affected**	**Relevant Australian national security interests**	**Effects on sovereignty**	**Effects on people**
NE Asia	Korean Peninsula	D.P.R.K. R.O.K. China Russia Japan U.S.	3. Stability of the wider Asia-Pacific region 4. An international order that restrains aggression by states against each other and manages threats and risks including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, … state fragility and failure, intra-state conflict, and the security impacts of … resource scarcity	1. Armed conflict between D.P.R.K. and R.O.K. 2. Competition over maritime boundaries 3. Proliferation of WMD 4. Coalition involvement under 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty 5. Internal political instability 6. Cross-border refugee movement	**Fear** 1. Increased crime rate 2. Human rights abuses 3. Punitive punishments 4. Internal political unrest 5. Human trafficking **Want** 1. Starvation 2. Poverty 3. Inequitable resource distribution 4. Breakdown of family unit

Source: Created by author.

Maritime insecurity in Southeast Asia

Approximately 80 percent of Southeast Asia's total sovereign area is maritime. This area includes bodies of water such as the Malacca Strait, South China Sea, Sulu Sea, and Celebes Sea. As Southeast Asia links the Pacific and Indian Oceans, maritime commerce dominates the regional economy. Over one quarter of all global merchant shipping moves through the narrow stretch of water bordered by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore; the Malacca Strait.[18] Additionally, Southeast Asian waters contain excellent fishing grounds. Potential hydrocarbon exploration and extraction also promises significant revenues. Further, the close proximity of littoral states blurs maritime boundaries and generates competing claims to waterways and their associated resources. Therefore, the maritime environment of Southeast Asia presents threats to security driven by territorial disputes, terrorism and insurgency, and transnational maritime threats such as piracy. This research examines transnational maritime crime in the Malacca Strait.

Transnational maritime crime in the Malacca Strait

Transnational maritime crime consists of acts including piracy, smuggling, and terrorism at sea. Southeast Asia's archipelagic and littoral environment presents considerable opportunity for these acts. The late 1990s saw a rise in transnational maritime crime in Southeast Asia. This cause of this rise was a combination of weakened political authority, poor governance, and socio-economic distress generated by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.[19] Additionally, access to improved maritime technology and advanced weaponry made criminal elements more readily able to attack targets of opportunity. The volume of maritime traffic traversing the Malacca Strait increased the

number of potential targets for criminal elements, with shipping numbers continuing to rise commensurate with Asia's energy and natural resource requirements.

By the beginning of the 21st century, Indonesian waters had earned the reputation of being the world's most pirate-infested.[20] Illegal trafficking of weapons, people, and narcotics also helped to arm, man, and fund the separatist movement in the Indonesian province of Aceh.[21] Following the October 2000 bombing of the *USS Cole* and 11 September 2001 attacks in the U.S., large-scale maritime terror within the Malacca Strait gained credibility. The December 2001 discovery of al-Qaeda plans to attack U.S. warships in Singapore harbor confirmed the relevance of this threat.[22] In combination, transnational maritime threats within the Malacca Strait receive considerable attention from not only Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, but also the wider international community who depend on the security of this waterway for unimpeded commerce.

Southeast Asia has traditionally been a global maritime piracy hotspot. In 2000, 242 out of 469 reported global piracy attacks occurred in the region.[23] Increased international cooperation between Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore significantly affected the success of maritime criminal organizations during the mid-2000s. However, while overall incident levels reduced, enforcement agencies apprehended very few criminal elements.[24] This apprehension rate indicates that pirates and other criminal elements chose to suspend operations during periods of increased patrolling. When security budgets reduced following the 2008 global financial crisis, transnational maritime criminal activity increased. As a result, Southeast Asia experienced a 60 percent rise in piracy in 2010.[25] Therefore, despite substantial international effort over the past

decade, Southeast Asia is second only to the Gulf of Aden as the most pirate-infested area of the world.

Transnational maritime crime in the Malacca Strait is a function of several variables. Poverty remains a significant concern for many of the littoral states of Southeast Asia. Therefore, piracy, smuggling, and extremism present livelihood opportunities for the disadvantaged. Further, overfishing and intense competition reduces legitimate income for traditional seafaring communities and forces them to look for alternate means of survival. Additionally, the geography of the Malacca Strait makes the task of policing incredibly difficult. The vastness of coastline presents both an economic challenge to the countries responsible for patrolling and an opportunity for criminals to operate undetected. Finally, since piracy has a long tradition within littoral states, many smaller communities perceive the practice as socially acceptable. In some ways, piracy and transnational crime are "an essential part of the local economy."[26]

Piracy and robbery at sea ranges from low-scale stealing of valuables to hijacking ships, killing crews or setting them adrift, removing cargo, and fraudulently altering the ship's identity. Until the late 1990s, most acts of piracy in the Malacca Strait displayed lower levels of violence. However, in recent years Southeast Asian pirates have increased their intensity, to include taking crews hostage and ransoming them from the surrounding jungle.[27] Automatic weapons and grenade launchers have also become commonplace in the Malacca Strait. The combination of increased intensity and execution of piracy within the Malacca Strait since 2009 presents a legitimate threat to international commerce.

The interconnected nature of transnational maritime crime in the Malacca Strait sets conditions for acts of piracy and sea robbery to link with terrorist or extremist

motives. Piracy may provide either funding for land-based terror attacks or enable

spectacular maritime attacks. Terror scenarios within the Malacca Strait include the

sinking of a large vessel to block commercial traffic, or direct attacks reminiscent of that

against the *USS Cole*.[28] Further, terror groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah operating from

Indonesia may adopt tactics used by other terror groups within Southeast Asia. For

example, Abu Sayyaf has successfully used maritime operations to execute terror attacks

in the southern Philippines. Operations have included kidnapping, amphibious raids, and

the sinking of large vessels. While not currently adopted by Straits-based terror groups,

these techniques present credible threats within the Malacca Strait.

Supported by extra-regional powers, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have

adopted cooperative policies to counter the threats presented by transnational maritime

crime in the Malacca Strait. However, these cooperative measures have, at times,

struggled to overcome the ASEAN principle of non-interference. Specifically, greater

cooperation has not yet yielded agreements on extra-territorial law enforcement rights,

extradition guarantees, or "hot pursuit" arrangements.[29] Despite these challenges, reduced

sovereign sensitivities in the Malacca Strait since 2004 have contributed to greater

collaboration on issues related to transnational maritime crime, although traditional and

non-traditional security concerns remain.

Implications for security

Traditional security threats do not historically include transnational maritime

crime. However, piracy, sea robbery, smuggling, and terrorism in the Malacca Strait have

reached such levels that they provide sovereign security concerns. Given the increasingly

interconnected global economic system, threats to commercial shipping within the

Malacca Strait may cause nations to encroach on the sovereignty of the Strait's nations to ensure safe passage of shipping. For example, misunderstanding between the Strait's nations and the U.S. in 2004 led to rising tension in bilateral relations.[30]

U.S. plans to deploy Special Forces elements to operate within the waterway were met with strong responses from both Malaysia and Indonesia. Each nation saw the move as a potential catalyst for increased Islamic extremism. However, despite strong Malaysian and Indonesian opposition to physical intervention of other countries within the Malacca Strait, they welcome offers of capacity building. Bilateral and multilateral initiatives implemented over the last several years have included training, exercises, and equipment transfer. Such measures achieve positive security results without undermining the legitimacy of the state. Due to the ASEAN principle of non-interference, the Malaysian and Indonesian reaction to sovereign encroachment is not surprising.

Transnational maritime crime also threatens sovereignty by providing the ability for terrorist and guerilla groups to move weapons and personnel, raise funds, and recruit new members. Indonesia faces separatist movements from several locations within the archipelago. The most credible exist within Aceh and West Papua. In Aceh, separatist elements have used transnational maritime crime to fund, man, and arm their insurgency.[31] Movement of weapons and people from the Malay Peninsula to Indonesia provided the forces needed to maintain the insurgency, with piracy used to raise funds. The 2008 Indonesian Defense White Paper was primarily concerned with secession and national unity as threats to sovereignty. Transnational maritime crime provides the means for secessionist groups to execute this sovereign threat to sovereignty.

Transnational maritime crime also crosses the boundary between threats to sovereignty and threats to the people. Policing absorbs considerable national resources, redirecting them from national development expenditure. Southeast Asia suffers from very high levels of poverty, generating want within the local population. Development programs aimed at alleviating poverty require considerable national funding and international donations. However, with national resources directed to fighting transnational maritime crime, the prospects of breaking the poverty cycle are grim. Further, people living in conditions of want often turn to crime as a means of providing for themselves and their families, creating fear amongst others in the community. The fear and want cycle therefore presents direct threats to human security. The loop also creates opportunity for extremist or separatist sentiment to grow, destabilizing the nation internally.

Australia's security interests

Aside from the prevention of armed attack against Australia, the security, stability and cohesion of the immediate neighborhood is Australia's principal national security priority. The 2009 Australian Defense White Paper specifically includes Indonesia as a member of the immediate neighborhood.[32] Further, Australia's third national security priority is stability of the wider Asia-Pacific region. Disruption within the Malacca Strait directly affects the broader Asia-Pacific region. The strategic importance of the Strait to global commerce makes it a potential flashpoint for international competition, destabilizing the region. Transnational maritime crime in the Malacca Strait has a direct impact on the security, stability and cohesion of Indonesia. Crime also destabilizes the

wider Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, addressing the transnational maritime security in the Malacca Strait is in Australia's national security interests.

Transnational maritime crime in the Malacca Strait presents both sovereign and human security concerns for the Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Further, the ASEAN principle of non-interference reinforces the importance of sovereignty to these nations. Therefore, any Australian security policy approach must consider implications to sovereignty. Bilateral and multilateral agreements, working within the sovereign framework of the littoral states, enable Australia to contribute to policing and capacity building.

Additionally, while direct threats to Australia from transnational maritime crime may be unclear, there are secondary implications for Australian sovereignty. First, the majority of refugees seeking asylum in Australia traverse the Indonesian archipelago. Bilateral agreements with both Indonesia and Malaysia in recent years identify this threat to territorial sovereignty, with further policy action required to find the correct balance. Further, terror groups operating within Southeast Asia, particularly Jemaah Islamiyah, present a threat to the Australian mainland. However, threats to the Australian mainland through terror attacks and small-scale refugee movements do not significantly undermine national sovereignty.

People smuggling and illegal refugee transportation have a large human cost. Many of those turning to crime are at the lowest end of the development scale. Provision of basic human needs of food, shelter, medicine and security will address the human security threats. Addressing the want will also reduce the propensity for crime by breaking the fear and want cycle. Measures to mitigate the effects of these threats fit

within a human security policy framework where state-centric means remain available for the pursuit of human security ends. Table 4 summarizes policy analysis for transnational maritime crime in Southeast Asia.

Table 4.   Summary of policy analysis for maritime security in Southeast Asia

Region	Threat	Countries affected	Relevant Australian national security interests	Effects on sovereignty	Effects on people
SE Asia	Maritime security	All Southeast Asian nations All nations reliant on maritime commerce	2. Security, stability, and cohesion of the immediate neighborhood 3. Stability of the wider Asia-Pacific region	1. International encroachment on sovereign waters to maintain freedom of navigation 2. Internal political instability driven by separatists, terror groups, or insurgents	**Fear** 1. Maritime crime 2. Human trafficking 3. Terrorism **Want** 1. Increased poverty 2. Economic security

Source: Created by author.

Climate change in the Southwest Pacific

"Sea-level rise and other related consequences of climate change are grave security threats to the very existence as homelands and nation states."[33]

The Southwest Pacific nations, excluding Australia and New Zealand, comprise only 550,000 square kilometers of land mass. Despite this, their combined economic exclusion zone is 30 million square kilometers.[34] Over 50 percent of the region's population of 8.6 million lives within 1.5 kilometers of the coastline. Southwest Pacific states are low in income and heavily dependent on natural resources to meet their basic

needs. Recorded climate changes since 1957 indicate accelerated warming of the atmosphere (0.8 degrees Celsius) and seawater (0.4 degrees Celsius), increased frequency and severity of storm events, and changes to rainfall patterns.[35] The 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report forecast continuing global climate change, with a worst-case assessment of ambient temperature rise of 3.5 degrees Celsius and sea level rise of 95 centimeters above current levels by 2100.[36] While this study acknowledges enduring scientific debate over the role of human influence in climate change, research will focus on the implications of change, not the cause.

The worst-case climate change scenario

This study uses the 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change worst-case scenario forecast to assess security impacts of climate change in the Southwest Pacific. Using this assessment, a worst-case scenario for the Southwest Pacific reflects the following:

1. Sea level rises cause the atoll nations of Kiribati, Tuvalu, and the Marshall Islands to become uninhabitable. The loss of outlying islands will reduce the economic exclusion zone of some Pacific Islands states.

2. On larger islands, sea level rises directly threaten the ongoing viability of most social infrastructure in the Southwest Pacific.

3. Coastal degradation caused by industrial exploitation of natural resources and increased damage from storm activity results in increased salt-water incursion resources along the coastal zone.

4. Predicted reduction in rainfall limits ground harvesting of drinking water. Due to the absence of irrigation systems across most Pacific Islands states, reduced rainfall

further inhibits crop yields. Coupled with land loss caused by increasing sea levels, the threat to crop yields presents a significant challenge to food security.

5. Increased soil salinity reduces soil fertility, contributing to reduced agricultural yields and increased rural to urban migration.

6. Increased coral bleaching reduces marine habitats upon which much of the Pacific Island states depend for both their personal food security and for the income generated through sale of licenses to commercial interests. Changes to deep-sea migratory patterns caused by sea temperature rises negatively influence the food security of most Pacific Island states.

7. Increased incidence of major weather events, including cyclones and storm surges, remove considerable social infrastructure and devastate cash crops required for foreign exchange earnings.

8. Increased prevalence of vector-borne diseases, including malaria and dengue fever, will affect human health.[37]

Papua New Guinea and the larger islands of the Southwest Pacific, such as Viti Levu in Fiji, will not feel the direct effect of sea level rise as seriously as the atoll nations and smaller islands. However, since these islands retain the predominance of their population within 1.5 km of the coast, they remain vulnerable to increased storm surge activity and coastal zone erosion. Further, the secondary impacts of temperature and sea level rises, including rural to urban migration, food shortages, and threats to human health, will significantly affect islands with greater population bases. Therefore, climate change directly affects all Southwest Pacific states. Any policy approach to addressing

climate change within the Southwest Pacific must recognize the regional pertinence of this security challenge.

Implications for security

As a non-traditional security challenge, the worst-case climate change scenario presents threats to both sovereignty and human security. Challenges to sovereignty affect the territorial and political integrity of Southwest Pacific nations and their regional neighbors. Sovereignty threats also generate human security concerns. The forecast inhabitability of atoll nations is the most obvious challenge to territorial sovereignty. If the sovereign states of Kiribati, Tuvalu, and the Marshall Islands are no longer habitable, entire national populations will undergo involuntary relocation. This forced migration presents challenges to not only the nations themselves, but also surrounding island states and larger nations who receive the environmental refugees.

Relocation of an entire national population also raises the question of whether a sovereign entity comprises the territorial area or population of a country. For example, the 2008 request by Kiribati for Australia and New Zealand to accept i-Kiribati as permanent refugees posed such difficulties.[38] Therefore, while threats to territorial sovereignty are relatively simple to define, the political sovereignty of vulnerable Southwest Pacific states is potentially more difficult. Creating politically sovereign entities within the territorial boundaries of existing nations generates the potential for friction as members of each group become disaffected. Even without enduring political sovereignty, large ethnically homogenous refugee populations change the cultural balance at their destination and contribute to high urban unemployment. Inequitable development models also exploit ethnic divisions and increase friction.[39] If poorly

managed, this friction presents a flashpoint for violent conflict and the nucleus of fear

amongst each population group.

Even for those nations who retain habitable land, the loss of outlying islands may

have significant impacts on the size of Southwest Pacific states' economic exclusion

zones. Other nations, both regionally and globally, would welcome the opportunity to

exploit these changes. This exploitation raises the potential for armed conflict between

competing states over access to fishing sites and seabed mineral resources. In this way,

climate change in the Southwest Pacific presents a traditional security dilemma for the

region.

In addition, the loss of personal and national income from a reduction in sea

territory, combined with deteriorating land-based agricultural conditions, creates

circumstances for economic insecurity and greater dependence on foreign aid. To counter

this, local governments may resort to further exploitation of resources, contributing to

accelerated environmental degradation though deforestation and overfishing. Further, in

line with the Marshall Islands, other nations may look to utilize their uninhabitable lands

for hazardous material waste sites to generate foreign income.[40] This raises the additional

specter of maritime contamination if sea levels continue to rise and inundate these waste

sites. Therefore, each of these economic security challenges present threats to human

security, under both the narrow and broad conceptual approaches.

Security challenges borne out of threats to sovereignty are only some of the

anticipated effects of climate change in the Southwest Pacific. Rural to urban migration,

destruction of coastal infrastructure, decreased availability of fresh water, and increased

soil salinity directly correlate to the broad concept of human security. Rural to urban

70

migration places greater strain on urban services and generates a series of socio-economic problems. These problems include pollution, increased urban unemployment, reduced health standards due to overcrowding, and increased crime rates. As human security concerns, each contribute to want amongst the people. Destabilization of food and water security, human health, and access to basic services affects quality of life. Since the purpose of human security is to protect individuals, quality of life erosion is counter-productive to human security ends.

Australia's security interests

Australia's 2009 Defense White Paper clearly defines security interests in the Southwest Pacific. Following defense against armed attack, security, stability, and cohesion of the immediate neighborhood ranks as Australia's second strategic security priority. Australia's definition of 'the immediate neighborhood' specifically includes South Pacific Island States. Further, Australia's fourth security priority seeks to preserve "an international order that . . . manages threats and risks including . . . the security impacts of climate change and resource scarcity."[41] Therefore, addressing security concerns within the Southwest Pacific created by climate change is in Australia's national security interests.

Australian investment in sustainable development and adaptation programs across the Southwest Pacific will directly support national security interests. Some of the challenges presented by climate change have traditional security implications. Despite this, the majority of the problems fit neatly into a human security policy framework where the individual is the principal referent. Regional development programs aimed at helping PIF nations adapt to climate change do not require a state-centric approach.

While the loss of territory may be unpreventable, a people-centric sustainable

development strategy can reduce the risks to political sovereignty created by climate

change. Diplomatic engagement with regional leaders can generate policy that considers

the complex issues related to territorial and political sovereignty. Early multilateral

engagement through the PIF and, more broadly, the UN can set the conditions for

managing adaptation to climate change. It is in Australia's national security interests to

be involved in this process. Table 5 summarizes policy analysis of climate change in the

Southwest Pacific.

Table 5.	Summary of policy analysis for climate change in the Southwest Pacific				
Region	Threat	Countries affected	Relevant Australian national security interests	Effects on sovereignty	Effects on people
SW Pacific	Climate change	All Pacific Islands Forum nations	2. Security, stability, and cohesion of the immediate neighborhood 4. An international order that … manages threats and risks including … the security impacts of climate change and resource scarcity.	1. Loss of land 2. Reduction in size of EEZ 3. Potential loss of political sovereignty for climate refugee nations 4. Armed conflict over access to resources 5. Internal political instability	**Fear** 1. Dislocation from culture and land 2. Ethnic tension **Want** 1. Water security 2. Food security 3. Economic security 4. Provision of basic services 5. Degraded human health standards

Source: Created by author.

---

[1]Brendan Howe and Kah-ul Kim, "North Korea: Policy Failures, Human
Insecurity, Consequences, and Prescriptions," *Korea Observer* 42, no. 2 (2011): 281.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Business Monitor International, "North East Asia Security Overview," *South Korea Defence & Security Report*, no. 4 (December 2011): 26.

[4]Business Monitor International, "Global Political Outlook," *South Korea Defence & Security Report*, no. 4 (December 2011): 10.

[5]Business Monitor International, "Executive Summary," *South Korea Defence & Security Report*, no. 4 (December 2011): 5.

[6]Howe and Kim, 281-310.

[7]Ibid., 290.

[8]Ibid., 291.

[9]Business Monitor International, "Political Overview," *South Korea Defence & Security Report*, no. 4 (December 2011): 42.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Donald Kirk, "The Death of the Sunshine Policy," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 172, no. 5 (June 2009): 33.

[12]Seung-Ho Joo and Euikon Kim, "Beyond the "Sunshine" and "Mutual Benefits and Common Prosperity" Policies: GRIT as the Viable Alternative," *Korea Observer* 42, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 255.

[13]Business Monitor International, "Security Overview," *South Korea Defence & Security Report*, no. 4 (December 2011): 51.

[14]Ibid., 56.

[15]Commonwealth of Australia, *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*.

[16]Ibid., 43.

[17]Ibid., 96.

[18]Rommel C. Banlaoi, "Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: Current Situation, Countermeasures, Achievements and Recurring Challenges," http://counterpiracy.ae/briefing_papers/Banlaoi%20Maritime%20Piracy%20in%20Southeast%20Asia.pdf (accessed 27 October 2011).

[19]Ian Storey, "Maritime Security in Southeast Asia," *Southeast Asian Affairs* (January 2009): 36.

[20]John F. Bradford, "The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia," *Naval War College Review* 58, no. 3 (Summer 2005): 63.

[21]Ibid., 67.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Banlaoi, 4.

[24]Business Monitor International, "South East Asia Security Overview," *Singapore Defence & Security Report* (December 2010): 28.

[25]Banlaoi, 4.

[26]Ibid., 2.

[27]Bradford, 72.

[28]Storey, 36-58.

[29]Bradford, 74.

[30]Storey, 36-58.

[31]Bradford, 74.

[32]Commonwealth of Australia, *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*.

[33]Leo A. Falcam, *2001 Address to the East-West Center Senior Policy Seminar*.

[34]Jon Barnett, "Titanic States? Impacts and Responses to Climate Change in the Pacific Islands," *Journal of International Affairs* 59, no. 1 (Fall 2005): 206.

[35]Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

[36]Ibid.

[37]Ibid.

[38]Kathy Marks, "Paradise Lost: Climate Change Forces South Sea Islanders to Seek Sanctuary Abroad," *The Independent*, 6 July 2008.

[39]Michael J. Edwards, "Security Implications of a Worst-Case Scenario of Climate Change in the South-West Pacific," *Australian Geographer* 30, no. 3 (November 1999): 311.

[40]Ibid.

[41]Commonwealth of Australia, *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030.*

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Threats to security within the Asia-Pacific region continue to evolve. Traditional and non-traditional threats to state sovereignty and individuals exist across the region. The end of the Cold War changed the political balance within the Asia-Pacific region and reduced traditional security concerns as the threat of communism diminished. Further, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis created considerable challenges for development and poverty reduction. Natural disasters and pandemics in the early period of the 21st century exacerbated the want experienced by individuals across the region and forced governments to look inward for threats to security and stability. However, the dominant security policy within the Asia-Pacific region remains state-centric. This policy approach potentially generates instability by undervaluing the importance of individual security.

The UN advocates human security as a means of providing freedom from want and freedom from fear for individuals. However, despite the altruistic motives of the UN, neatly separating traditional and human security is unrealistic, as sovereignty remains the foundation of the international system. Therefore, a human security policy approach must include the state-centric means available through instruments of national power. This research has investigated whether application of such a human security policy approach is in Australia's national security interests.

This thesis analyzed various definitions of human security, identifying both broad and narrow approaches to address fear and want. The research also identified that Australia's enduring national security objectives and interests were well defined and pursued using a state-centric policy approach. Further, the study reviewed the security

policies of Asia-Pacific region nations, with state-centric policy approaches dominating the literature. Finally, the research analyzed case studies addressing threats in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Southwest Pacific. This chapter presents the conclusions of the study, recommendations for Australian policy makers, and recommendations for further research.

Conclusions

The purpose of this research was to determine if a human security policy approach in the Asia-Pacific region is in Australia's national security interests. To address this dilemma, the study first asked what these interests are, and determined their application to the Asia-Pacific region. Australia's national security interests nest within the national security objectives outlined by former Prime Minster Kevin Rudd in 2008. The national security interests are, in priority order:

1. The defense of Australia against armed attack.

2. The security, stability and cohesion of the immediate neighborhood, shared with Indonesia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Timor Leste, and the South Pacific Island states. In this regard, stability and cohesiveness of Indonesia is in Australia's vital national security interests.

3. Stability of the wider Asia-Pacific region.

4. Preservation of an international order that restrains aggression by states against each other and manages threats and risks including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, state fragility and failure, intra-state conflict, and the security impacts of climate change and resource scarcity.[1]

The Asia-Pacific region dominates Australia's national security interests. While acknowledging no current traditional threat to political or territorial sovereignty, Australia remains aware of the importance of secure northern approaches to the continent and a stable local region. Further, Australian strategic policy has evolved over the last 25 years and now considers non-traditional threats as significant destabilizing factors with the potential to undermine national security interests. However, Australia's security policy remains state-centric.

To give Australian security policy some context, the research also questioned the current security threats and dominant national security approaches in the Asia-Pacific region. The region is subject to a wide variation of security threats ranging from the D.P.R.K. nuclear program in Northeast Asia to the impacts of climate change in the Southwest Pacific. Other critical challenges include land and maritime border disputes, secessionist movements, poverty and development concerns, terrorism, and transnational maritime crime. Despite the variation in challenges, both Southeast and Northeast Asian nations have state-centric approaches to security. Southwest Pacific nations, less Fiji, lack clear strategic policy guidance, which makes it impossible to determine the current policy paradigm within the sub-region.

To determine if a human security policy approach would address the regional security threats, the author undertook three case studies. The first, tension on the Korean Peninsula, highlighted both traditional and human security concerns. Territorial sovereignty concerns affect not only the D.P.R.K. and the R.O.K., but also China, Russia, and Japan. Further, due to the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty, any military conflict on the Peninsula is likely to include Australia's principal strategic ally, the U.S. Expected

78

effects on sovereignty include armed conflict over land-based territorial disputes and maritime boundaries, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction within the D.P.R.K. However, the human security effects forecast for the Korean Peninsula are considerable. The current famine and level of poverty affecting the D.P.R.K. generates a cycle of fear and want amongst the population. This cycle includes inequitable distribution of resources, crime increases, breakdown of the family unit, human trafficking, and cross-border refugee movement. As refugee movement also affects surrounding countries, human security concerns give rise to punitive punishments and human rights abuses. Ultimately, the fear and want cycle may cause internal political unrest, generating more fear through the threat of violence.

The Southeast Asian case study focused on transnational maritime crime within the Malacca Strait. Threats to sovereignty predominantly affect Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Additionally, since the Malacca Strait carries over one quarter of the world's maritime commerce, security threats have the potential to disrupt global commerce. The most obvious challenge to sovereignty is encroachment on territorial waters by international actors seeking to ensure freedom of navigation. Lesser known sovereign threats include internal political instability driven by separatists, terror groups, or insurgents. Poverty and a lack of development drive human security concerns. Eroded economic security directs individuals toward maritime crime, human trafficking, and extremism, demonstrating the fear and want cycle present on the Korean Peninsula.

The final case study explored a worst-case climate change scenario in the Southwest Pacific. Threats to sovereignty in the Southwest Pacific include the loss of land and associated reduction in Economic Exclusion Zone size. In extreme cases, some

sovereign nations will become uninhabitable. In additional to territorial sovereignty concerns, nations who become climate refugees also face the challenge of lost political sovereignty. Further, the potential for armed conflict increases as resources including fresh water and arable land become scarce. Human security concerns impact both fear and want. The effects of climate change will dislocate the people from their land and culture. Forced migration may also generate ethnic tension as internal rural to urban migration and large groups of ethnically homogenous refugees encroach on established communities. These problems generate both fear and want within the society as poor water, food, health, and economic security exacerbate ethnic and cultural friction. Further, large migrant or refugee groups challenge national capacity to provide basic services. As in the previous case studies, fear and want operate within a cycle to define the human security challenges of climate change in the Southwest Pacific.

While sovereign threats dominate security discourse on the Korean Peninsula, there is no direct threat to Australian political or territorial sovereignty. Any conflict escalation on the Peninsula is highly unlikely to result in armed attack against Australia. Additionally, threats to territorial sovereignty within Southeast Asia are likely to be contained within the local sub-region. Transnational maritime crime, particularly people smuggling, illegal fishing, and threats of terrorism are likely to encroach on Australia's sovereign borders. However, armed attack aimed at undermining Australian territorial sovereignty is improbable. Further, the threats of climate change in the Southwest Pacific may have sovereign implications for Australia, but not in direct territorial security terms. People displaced by climate change may look for refuge within Australia, but they will

not launch armed attacks. Therefore, while security threats facing the Asia-Pacific region have traditional implications, Australia's sovereignty is unlikely to be directly threatened.

Commensurately, Australia is able to soften its approach to sovereignty and modify its security policy approach to maximize stability and security across the Asia-Pacific region without increasing the risk of armed attack against the nation. While the ASEAN principle of non-interference remains a consideration for transnational engagement in the region, Australia does not need to demand that others soften their stance on sovereignty unless ready. Most human security issues do not require military intervention. Application of the remaining instruments of national power as the means to achieve human security ends need not threaten the sovereignty of regional nations. On the rare occasion where neglect of sovereign responsibility is the security problem itself, Australia retains the right to invoke the Responsibility to Protect through the UN. In this way, pursuing a human security policy approach in the Asia-Pacific region would achieve Australia's national security objectives. Therefore, a human security policy approach is in Australia's national security interests.

<center>Recommendations for Australian policy makers</center>

This study provides two recommendations for Australian policy makers. First, this research determined that there is no current credible threat to Australian sovereignty. Further, traditional and non-traditional security concerns within the Asia-Pacific region all contain human security elements. Therefore, the Australian government should implement a human security policy approach within the Asia-Pacific region. The approach should utilize the CHS endorsed separation of human security into conflict and human security, and development and human security. Separating the concept in this way

will erode barriers to effective prioritization. By preparing Australian human security

policy along these lines, the national security apparatus will be able to address the broad

range of factors generating fear and want within the region. This separation also makes

the concept less daunting and allows application of various elements of national power to

the range of security issues present within the Asia-Pacific region.

The second recommendation made by this study is that the Australian government

should strengthen interagency relationships to ensure the instruments of national power

pursue security objectives coherently. The diplomatic, informational, and economic

instruments of national power should be the dominant means. However, a credible

military must also remain to deter armed aggression against Australia and to provide an

intervention force under the Responsibility to Protect.

<u>Recommendation for future research</u>

As human security gains greater credibility within the international community,

the ASEAN principle of non-interference may soften. Since human security is a

transnational concept, collective security organizations may provide a suitable means for

implementing human security policy. Further research should investigate the feasibility

of a collective security organization within the Asia-Pacific region, and its likely effects

on traditional and non-traditional security challenges.

---

[1]Commonwealth of Australia, *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030.*

GLOSSARY

Asia-Pacific region. All countries that are members of ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). In addition, China, Japan, the R.O.K., Fiji, the D.P.R.K., and Timor Leste, are also included due to their geographic location.

Human security. A security framework in which the principal referent is the individual. Human security seeks to free individuals from fear and want.[1]

Human security policy approach. As human and traditional security approaches cannot be neatly separated, for the purposes of this study, human security policy refers to human security ends supported by state-centric means.

Instruments of national power. State-centric means available to the Government of Australia in executing security strategy. In accordance with U.S. military doctrine, the instruments of national power are Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic.[2]

Non-traditional security. Non-traditional security crosses the boundary between human and traditional security by including threats such as terrorism, natural disasters, climate change, transnational maritime crime, and illegal weapons transit. Non-traditional security threats also include those generated by poor social development.

Traditional security. A security framework where the principal referent is the state. Traditional security seeks to ensure the survival of the nation state.[3]

---

[1]Hampson, 229-243.

[2]United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, I-9.

[3]United Nations.

APPENDIX A

SUMMARY OF POLICY ANALYSIS

Region	Threat	Countries affected	Relevant Australian national security interests	Effects on sovereignty	Effects on people
NE Asia	Korean Peninsula tensions	D.P.R.K. R.O.K. China Russia Japan U.S.	3. Stability of the wider Asia-Pacific region 4. An international order that restrains aggression by states against each other and manages threats and risks including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, … state fragility and failure, intra-state conflict, and the security impacts of … resource scarcity	1. Armed conflict between D.P.R.K. and R.O.K. 2. Competition over maritime boundaries 3. Proliferation of WMD 4. Coalition involvement under 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty 5. Internal political instability 6. Cross-border refugee movement	**Fear** 1. Increased crime rate 2. Human rights abuses 3. Punitive punishments 4. Internal political unrest 5. Human trafficking **Want** 1. Starvation 2. Poverty 3. Inequitable resource distribution 4. Breakdown of family unit
SE Asia	Maritime security	All Southeast Asian nations All nations reliant on maritime commerce	2. Security, stability, and cohesion of the immediate neighborhood 3. Stability of the wider Asia-Pacific region	1. International encroachment on sovereign waters to maintain freedom of navigation 2. Internal political instability driven by separatists, terror groups, or insurgents	**Fear** 1. Maritime crime 2. Human trafficking 3. Terrorism **Want** 1. Increased poverty 2. Economic security
SW Pacific	Climate change	All Pacific Islands Forum nations	2. Security, stability, and cohesion of the immediate neighborhood 4. An international order that … manages threats and risks including … the security impacts of climate change and resource scarcity.	1. Loss of land 2. Reduction in size of EEZ 3. Potential loss of political sovereignty for climate refugee nations 4. Armed conflict over access to resources 5. Internal political instability	**Fear** 1. Dislocation from culture and land 2. Ethnic tension **Want** 1. Water security 2. Food security 3. Economic security 4. Provision of basic services 5. Degraded human health standards

Source: Created by author.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Periodicals and Journals

Arase, David. "Non-Traditional Security in China-ASEAN Cooperation." *Asian Survey* 50, no. 4 (July 2010): 808-33.

Ayson, Robert. "The 'Arc of Instability' and Australia's Strategic Policy." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 61, no. 2 (June 2007): 215-31.

Barnett, Jon. "Titanic States? Impacts and Responses to Climate Change in the Pacific Islands." *Journal of International Affairs* 59, no. 1 (Fall 2005): 203-19.

Bellamy, Alex J., and M. McDonald. "'The Utility of Human Security': Which Humans? what Security? A Reply to Thomas and Tow." *Security Dialogue* 33, no. 3 (September 2002): 373-7.

Bradford, John F. "The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia." *Naval War College Review* 58, no. 3 (Summer 2005): 63-86.

Burke, Anthony. "Caught between National and Human Security: Knowledge and Power in Post-Crisis Asia." *Pacifica Review* 13, no. 3 (2001): 215-39.

Business Monitor International. "Executive Summary." *South Korea Defence & Security Report*, no. 4 (December 2011): 5-6.

———. "Global Political Outlook." *South Korea Defence & Security Report*, no. 4 (December 2011): 10-25.

———. "North East Asia Security Overview." *South Korea Defence & Security Report*, no. 4 (December 2011): 26-37.

———. "Political Overview." *South Korea Defence & Security Report*, no. 4 (December 2011): 42-50.

———. "Security Overview." *South Korea Defence & Security Report*, no. 4 (December 2011): 51-63.

———. "South East Asia Security Overview." *Singapore Defence & Security Report* (December 2010): 28-38.

Dosch, Jörn. "ASEAN's Reluctant Liberal Turn and the Thorny Road to Democracy Promotion." *The Pacific Review* 21, no. 4 (2008): 527-45.

Edwards, Michael J. "Security Implications of a Worst-Case Scenario of Climate Change in the South-West Pacific." *Australian Geographer* 30, no. 3 (November 1999): 311-30.

Foong Khong, Yuen. "Human Security: A Shotgun Approach to Alleviating Human Misery?" *Global Governance* 7, no. 3 (July 2001): 231-36.

Howe, Brendan, and Kah-ul Kim. "North Korea: Policy Failures, Human Insecurity, Consequences, and Prescriptions." *Korea Observer* 42, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 281-310.

Kirk, Donald. "The Death of the Sunshine Policy." *Far Eastern Economic Review* 172, no. 5 (June 2009): 33-6.

Lam, Peng Er. "Singapore's Security Outlook: The Immutability of History, Geography and Demography?" *National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, Joint Research Series* 5 (October 2010): 55-66.

Mack, Andrew. "A Signifier of Shared Values." *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 3 (September 2004): 366-7.

McCarthy, Stephen. "Burma and ASEAN; Estranged Bedfellows." *Asian Survey* 48, no. 6 (November 2008): 911-35.

Morada, Noel M. "The Philippine's Security Outlook in 2010." *National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, Joint Research Series* 5 (October 2010): 37-54.

Nishikawa, Yukiko. "Human Security in Southeast Asia: Viable Solution Or Empty Slogan?" *Security Dialogue* 40, no. 2 (April 2009): 213-36.

Seung-Ho Joo, and Euikon Kim. "Beyond the 'Sunshine' and 'Mutual Benefits and Common Prosperity' Policies: GRIT as the Viable Alternative." *Korea Observer* 42, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 255-80.

Sotharith, Chap. "Cambodia's Security Challenges and Implications for Defense Policy." *National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, Joint Research Series* 5 (October 2010): 95-106.

Storey, Ian. "Maritime Security in Southeast Asia." *Southeast Asian Affairs* (January 2009): 36-58.

Sukma, Rizal. "Indonesia's Security Outlook, Defense Policy and Regional Cooperation." *National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, Joint Research Series* 5 (October 2010): 3-24.

Tang Siew Mun. "Malaysia's Security Outlook and Challenges." *National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, Joint Research Series* 5 (October 2010): 25-36.

Tarte, Sandra. "Fiji Islands' Security Challenges and Defense Policy Issues." *National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, Joint Research Series* 5 (October 2010): 67-84.

Tin Maung Maung Than. "Tatmadaw and Myanmar's Security Challenges." *National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, Joint Research Series* 5 (October 2010): 123-40.

Thomas, Nicholas and William T. Tow. "'the Utility of Human Security': Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention." *Security Dialogue* 33, no. 2 (June 2002): 177-92.

Tow, William T. and Richard Rigby. "China's Pragmatic Security Policy: The Middle-Power Factor." *China Journal*, no. 65 (January 2011): 157-78.

Books

Evans, Gareth. *The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for all.* Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008.

Hampson, Fen Osler. "Human Security." In *Security Studies: An Introduction*, edited by Paul D. Williams, 229-43. New York, NY: Routledge, 2009.

Government Documents

ASEAN Regional Forum. "About Us." http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/about.html (accessed 13 August 2011).

———. "The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper." http://www.asean.org/ 3635.htm (accessed 13 August 2011).

Asia-Pacific region Economic Cooperation. "Fact Sheet - Human Security." http://www. apec.org/apec/news___media/fact_sheets/200908fs_humansecurity.html (accessed 6 March 2011).

Association of Southeast Asian Nations. "Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations." http://www.asean.org/AC.htm (accessed 22 May 2011).

———. "Member Countries." http://www.aseansec.org/74.htm (accessed 20 April 2011).

Bainimarama, Josea. "Commander's Intent 2011." http://www.rfmf.mil.fj/news/ Commanders% 20Intent.html (accessed 3 June 2011).

Commonwealth of Australia. *Counter-Terrorism White Paper: Securing Australia - Protecting our Community.* Canberra, ACT: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2010.

———. *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*. Canberra, ACT: Australian Government Printing Service, 2009.

———. *The Defense of Australia.* Canberra, ACT: Australian Government Printing Service, 1987.

Commission on Human Security. *Human Security Now*. Washington, DC: Communications Development Incorporated, 2003.

Government of Fiji. *Draft White Paper 2005 - A Safe and Prosperous Fiji*. Suva, Fiji: Government of Fiji, 2005.

Government of Singapore. *The Fight Against Terror: Singapore's National Security Strategy*. Singapore: National Security Coordination Centre, 2004.

Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. *China's National Defense in 2010*. www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/ node_7114675.htm (accessed 24 May 2011).

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. *Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Japan Ministry of Defense. *Defense of Japan 2011*. Tokyo, Japan: Japanese Ministry of Defense, 2011.

Jefferson, Thomas. "Declaration of Independence." http://www.usconstitution.net/ declar.html (accessed 20 April 2011).

Kingdom of Cambodia. *Defense Policy of the Kingdom of Cambodia, 2006: Security, Development and International Cooperation.* Phnom Penh, Cambodia: Kingdom of Cambodia, 2006.

Kingdom of Tonga. *Looking to the Future, Building on the Past: Kingdom of Tonga Development Plan 8*. Vava'u, Tonga: Kingdom of Tonga, 2008.

New Zealand Government. *Defence White Paper 2010*. Wellington, New Zealand: New Zealand Ministry of Defence, 2010.

Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. "Member Countries." http://www.forumsec.org.fj/ (accessed 20 April 2011)

Papua New Guinea Department of Defence. *Key Assumptions for Defence Planning and Force Development 2008-2012*. http://www.defence.gov.pg/ (accessed 27 May 2011).

Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense. *Defense White Paper 2008*. South Korea: Defense Policy Division, Ministry of National Defense, 2008.

Royal Brunei Armed Forces. *Defence White Paper Update 2007: Shaping the Force Today*. http://www.mindef.gov.bn/new_home/whitepaper2007/english.pdf (accessed 7 May 2011).

Rudd, Kevin. *National Security Statement to the Parliament.* http://pmrudd.archive. dpmc.gov.au/node/5424 (accessed 23 April 2011).

Socialist Republic of Vietnam. *Vietnam National Defense - 2009.* http://merln.ndu.edu/ whitepapers/Vietnam2009.pdf (accessed 7 May 2011).

United Nations. "Human Security Report 2005." http://www.humansecurityreport.info (accessed 6 March 2011).

United Nations Development Programme. *Human Development Report 1994*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1994.

United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security. *Human Security in Theory and Practice: Application of the Human Security Concept and the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security.* New York, NY: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2009.

United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.* http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/docnet/courses/operations/ jtfcp/jp1.pdf (accessed 22 March 2011).

Other sources

Banlaoi, Rommel C. "Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: Current Situation, Countermeasures, Achievements and Recurring Challenges." http://counterpiracy .ae/briefing_papers/Banlaoi%20Maritime%20Piracy%20in%20Southeast%20Asi a.pdf (accessed 27 October 2011).

Chachavalpongpun, Pavin. "Thailand's New Defense White Paper." http://web1.iseas. edu.sg/?p=2769 (accessed 13 August 2011).

Chen, Jonathan K. "Building an Asia-Pacific region Security Community: A Role for Australia?" Honour's Thesis, Macalaster College, 2011.

Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. "Pacific Islands." www.child-soldiers.org/document/get?id=867 (accessed 28 May 2011).

Kerr, Pauline. "The Evolving Dialectic between State-Centric and Human-Centric Security." https://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/42112 (accessed 4 May 2011).

Marks, Kathy. "Paradise Lost: Climate Change Forces South Sea Islanders to Seek Sanctuary Abroad." *The Independent*, 6 July 2008.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
250 Gibbon Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

Defense Technical Information Center/OCA
825 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

Dr. Phillip Pattee
Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Mr. Richard Anderson
Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Mr. Dirk Ringgenberg
Department of Army Tactics
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301